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RESURRECTION OF THE PROHIBITION ON THE
CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: TEACHING
OLD DOGMA NEW TRICKS
Andri Hampton*
There can be no doubt but that more medical care at a less expensive
cost is needed today. However, where the health of the American
citizen is at stake, Machiavellian rationale does not and should not
apply.
Homer 7hornberry'
According to court papers, a Saginaw Michigan HMO patient with
vaginal bleeding was given antibiotics for five months before her
doctor sent her to a gynecologist. The specialist checked her for
venereal disease, found nothing and told her to return in a month.
However, her primary care doctor refused to approve a second visit.
Eight months after her initial visit, she went to an emergency room
where doctors performed a biopsy and discovered she had cervical
cancer. The HMO had set up financial pools to cover patients'
specialist appointments, tests and hospital care. Money left over at
the end of the year was split between the doctor and the HMO.
According to Circuit Judge Robert L. Kacmarek, ruling on the
HMO's motion for summary judgment: "The result was that the
fewer referrals a doctor made and the fewer hospitalizations he
ordered for his patients, the more money he made."
Los Angeles Times2
They paved paradise and put up a parking lot.
JoniMtchel 3
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; B.A.,
1979, J.D. & MPA, 1983, University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to Colette Singh, Robert Robinson,
and Constance Crawford for their research assistance on this Article, and to Hortense Cannon for her

secretarial assistance.
1. Garcia v. Texas State Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 440 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
2. Daniel Q. Haney & Fred Bayles, Pyinga Pice ForCost-ConsciusHMOsM idk, LA. TaM, Jan.
28, 1990, at 3, availabkin 1990 WL 2446298. These facts appear to be taken from the case Bush v. Dake,
a 1989 unpublished opinion from Michigan, which is reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW ET AL, THE LAW
OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 384 (1991). In Bush v. Doke, the judge denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the financial arrangements may have
contributed to the patient's injuries. See id

3. JONI MITCHELL, Big ellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise 1970).
They paved paradise,And put up a parking lot.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Most patients, even patients in health maintenance organizations (HMOs),4
do not comprehend the true magnitude of the changes in the basic relationship
between physicians and patients. Patients may believe that they have a more

difficult time obtaining services which they and their physicians believe are
necessary. 5 However, patients remain largely unconscious about the financial
incentives that are designed to encourage physicians to eliminate services
which are not "medically necessary." 6 The patient is even less aware of the
potential conflict of interest that such financial incentives pose for the
physician-patient relationship.7
When a medical mishap occurs and a

With a pink hotel, A boutiqueAnd a swinging hot spot.
Don't it always seem to go
That you don't know what you've got
Till it's gone
They paved paradise.
And put up parking lot.
4. "An HMO isan organized system of health care delivery for both hospital and physician services
in which care delivery and financing functions are offered by one organization. HMOs provide both
services to an enrolled membership for a fixed and prepaid fee." Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care,
UkationReview, and FintmcialRisk ShiJtng: CorpensatingPatientsfor Health Care Cost Containment Injuies, 17 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 20 (1994). As of 1995, there were 550 health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) in operation in the United States and 46.2 million people enrolled in HMOs. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvIcES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1995, 262, tbl. 136.
5. See Press Release from The Robert WoodJohnson Foundation, Sick People In Managed Care Have
Difficuly Getting Senices and Treatment (June 28, 1995) (on file with the University of Cincnnati Law Review)
(relating results of survey on non-elderly sick persons conducted over an eleven month period from June
1994-1995 by the Harvard School of Public Health & Louis Harris & A. Associates).
6. "Medically necessary" isthe proverbial tail that wags the dog. There are currently close to one
trillion dollars spent each year on medical services. There is much speculation about this amount, and
whether it reflects the cost of medically necessary procedures. This concept is fairly ill-defined and has
undergone some changes which are reflected in the discourse in this Article. At one point, all services
ordered by a physician were thought to be medically necessary. The phrase "medically necessary" now
generally assumes a definition somewhat akin to the following definition found in the rules and regulations
of the Civilian Health & Military Program of the Uniform Services (a health insurance program for
members of the military and their dependents): "The frequency, extent, types of medical services or
supplies which represent appropriate medical care and but are generally accepted by qualified professionals
to be reasonable and adequate for the diagnosis and treatment of illness, injury, pregnancy." 32 C.F.R.
§ 199.2 (1997). This language is similar to language found in a typical health insurance policy. See, e.g.,
Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 381 S.E.2d 330, 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (contract defines
medically necessary as "appropriate with regards to standards of good medical practice").
7. It is generally assumed that HMO enrollees are not generally informed about the financial
arrangements between the HMOs and their physicians. See, e.g., Deven C. McGraw, FinancialIncentives to
Limit Ser : Should PhysiciansBe Required to Disclose These To Patients, 83 GEO. LJ.1821, 1836. ("Although
the patient islikely to know about the use of extemal controls on medical services like utilization review,
most HMO enrollees are unaware of how their providers are reimbursed." (citing CLARK C. HAVIGHURST,
HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 122 (1995))).
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patient's attorney discovers the financial relationship between the physician
and the payer, the patient will feel betrayed.8 Even if a medical disaster does
not occur, a patient apprised of the financial incentives to limit unnecessary
care may become distrustful of the physician's judgment.9 Thus, by means of
"Machiavellian"' 0 financial techniques, insurance companies may have
"managed" care by depriving Americans of a luxury they previously enjoyed:
the luxury of believing that you could trust your physician."
At the turn of the century, there was a doctrine that operated as a guardian
against the imposition of lay control over the physician-patient relationship.
This doctrine is commonly referred to as the prohibition on the corporate
practice of medicine. 2 When the doctrine was viable it had two major
features: (1)physicians could not be employees of lay organizations, and (2)
physicians were prohibited from sharing their fees with lay persons.13 The
articulated rationale behind the rule was that it was necessary in order to
prevent lay profit motives from "corrupting medical judgment."' 4 The

8. See, e.g., David R. Olmos, Cuttig Medical Costs-Or Corers?, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at Al
(describing lawsuit by deceased patient's husband wherein it iscontended that financial incentives caused
his wife's death).
9. See David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of ManagedCare on Patient's Trust in Medical
Careand Their Physicians, 275JAMA 1693, 1694 (1996) (noting that disclosure of information about financial
incentives to limit care seems more likely to elicit distrust than trust).
10. Machiavelli was a sixteenth century political theorist who posited that politics isamoral and that
any means, however unscrupulous, can justifiably be used in achieving political power. Se MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1994). The term "Machiavellian" is used to suggest
conduct that ismarked by cunning, duplicity, or bad faith. See id. This phrase was used by the district court
in Garciav. Texas State BoardofMedicalExaminers to describe the perils that the court believed were inherent
in allowing lay influence over physicians by overturning the corporate practice doctrine. 384 F. Supp. 434
(W.D. Tex. 1974). It isthe premise of this Article that the abandonment of the doctrine has created an
environment in which the financing of health care is accomplished by techniques marked by cunning,
duplicity, or bad faith. Hence the use of the term "Machiavellian."
11. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1643 (noting that patients' trust in physicians is
threatened by the growth of managed care).
12.

See PAUL STARR, THE SOcIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 204 (1982) (noting

that between 1905 and 1917, courts in several states ruled that corporations could not engage in the
commercial practice of medicine); Mark Hall, The Corporate Practice of Medicine, in HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE LAW 3-1 (Mark A. Hall &Justin G. Vaughan, eds., 1994) [hereinafter Hall, CorporatePractice];
Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Comment, The CorporatePractice of Medicine Doctrin: An Anachronism in the Modrn

Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445 (1987); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control ofPhysician Beha :
Legal Barriers to Healh Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L REV. 431 (1988) [hereinafter Hall, Institutional
Control].
13. See Hall, CorporatePractice,supra note 12, at 3-1 ("Corporate practice occurs when administrators
hire doctors or when payment for medical services flows from the patient to the corporation before it goes
to the doctors rather than in a one-to-one payment relationship between doctor and patient."); ChaseLubitz, supra note 12, at 447 ("Generally, courts hold that the doctrine prohibited corporations from
practicing medicine through licensed employees or from realizing profits through the distribution of a
physician's professional services.").
14. Hall, CorporatePract/ce, supra note 12, at 3-12 ("Because employed physicians are subordinate to
the corporation, they may be forced to sacrifice patient welfare for the corporation's profit-maximizing
goals. Courts are naturally concerned that this conflict in loyalty would subvert quality of care.").
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corporate practice doctrine has been 5 credited with aiding the medical
profession in its struggle for autonomy.'
Adherence to the corporate practice doctrine, however, would also inhibit
physicians from engaging in price competition. 6
Policy-makers and
commentators perceived that, therefore, the doctrine stood as an obstacle to
health care cost containment. 7 When the nation's health care policy began
to focus on cost containment, the corporate practice doctrine fell into
disfavor."' This Article argues that the current emphasis on health care cost
containment requires that we resurrect the doctrine.
The health care delivery system in America involves two primary functions
that are inherently and naturally in conflict: the service delivery function and
the financing function. The service delivery function is controlled by the
physician who makes the decision to consume health care resources.' 9 The
financing function is performed by private and public payers of health care
services. The two activities are inherently antagonistic. If the physician
makes a decision that the patient needs a particular medical service, this
decision results in a depletion of the financial resources.
The fact that a physician's decision to provide medical care and the duty to
finance those services are in conflict means that physicians and payers of
health care services will have disputes over health care consumption. This is
good because the dynamic ruling physicians' behavior tends to cause
physicians to over-utilize health resources,20 and the dynamic ruling payers'
behavior tends to leave some necessary health needs unmet.2"
It is

15. SeeChase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 446-70.
16. See idat476.
17. See id. at 479 (noting that "in their efforts to provide medical services in a cost-conscious
environment, corporations have introduced alternative systems of health care delivery that are inconsistent
with the traditional norms of physician autonomy and that contravene the underpinnings of the corporate
practice doctrine").
18. Seeinfra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
19. See
Elaine Lu, The PontialEffect ofManaged Competition in Health Care on Irtvider Liability & Patient
Autonomy, 30 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 519, 527 (1993) ("Though doctors receive only about twenty percent of
each health care dollar, they influence seventy percent of total health care spending.").
20. SeeRandall, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that traditional reimbursement method created
"powerful incentives for all players in the health care system to intervene excessively with overpriced
procedures" and that "[n]o one had an incentive to economize"); seealso, Thomas Bodenheimer,
Reimbursing Physicians and Hospitals, 272 JAMA 971, 972 (1994) ("Under fee for service reimbursement,
physicians have an economic incentive to perform more services, since more services bring more fees.").
21. It issimply not feasible to cover all medically necessary services. Payers respond to this fact by
rationing on a macro level by establishing budgets for health care expenditures or by excluding from
coverage, or limiting coverage for, certain types of services that are medically necessary. For example,
mental health coverage traditionally has been limited. This aspect of the policy to undercover health needs
isdescribed as inevitable. See,
e.g.,Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic
is
Approach, 140 U. PA. L REV. 1597, 1603 ('There are limits to what we as a society ought to spend on health
care because ofother computing social goods that make legitimate claims on [a] finite set ofdollars. Hence,
the need for health rationing is inescapable."); seealso, Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69
N.Y.U. L REV. 693,694 ("When we are ill, we desperately want our doctors to do everything within their
power to heal us, regardless of the costs involved. Medical technology has advanced so far, however, that
literal adherence to this credo for everyone would consume the entire gross domestic product.").
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appropriate that disputes over the provision of medical services be explicit and
that the resolution of such disputes be salient. Utilization review is the process
by which a payer determines if medical services are appropriate and
necessary.22 This may include requiring a physician to obtain approval from
the payer before providing certain types of care, particularly, referrals to
specialists or admissions to hospitals for in-patient treatment. This process can
be highly contentious, but it is the type of salient process required to address
disputes over treatment decisions. However, this process, because of its
visibility, has fallen into disfavor as payers opt for more subtle means to
contain health care costs.
In the new health care environment, health care financing increasingly
involves arrangements that shift some of the financial risk of health care
expenditures from insurance companies and other payers of health care
services to physicians and other providers.23
"Risk sharing," as these
arrangements are known,24 imposes some of the financing function on
physicians. It is the contention of this Article that risk sharing is either: (1)
dangerous because it is designed to alter physician decision making, or (2)
dishonest because it is merely a covert means to transfer the cost of providing
health insurance coverage from insurers to physicians.
25
Because of their training and expertise, physicians operate as fiduciaries.
By imposing the financing function on physicians, risk-sharing arrangements
potentially undermine the integrity of physicians' exercise of their fiduciary
obligations to patients. 26 Risk sharing presents the physician with a

22. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g.,Alan L. Hillman, Fancial Incentsa for Physiciansin HIMOs: Is There A Conflict of Interest,
317 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1743 (1987). In this article, Dr. Hillman reported the results of a survey he
conducted in 1987 in which he mailed a questionnaire to the 595 HMOs known to be in operation as of
1986. See id. at 1744. Fifty-one percent of the HMOs responded. See id Of the respondents, forty-six
percent paid their physicians pursuant to the capitation method. See id. at 1745 tbl.2. Sixty-six percent
withheld some percentage of the physician's fees. See id at 1746 tbl.3. Capitation and fee withholding are
two mechanisms by which HMOs shift financial risk to physicians. See infta notes 102-14 and
accompanying text; see also Randall, supra note 4, at 30-31.
24. See infa notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
25. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy andPriv,: /%tcbtng PatientsFrom Their Physicia, 55 U. PrTr.
L. REV. 291, 348-49. (1994) ("Fiduciary relationships are generally described as those in which some aspect
of the relationship between parties justifies the imposition of special obligations on one of them. Several
treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary one and the courts have
tended to concur." (citingJ.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES, 29-4 (1981) and Thomas H. Boyd,
Cost Containment and the Physician's Fucia Duty to the Patient, 39 DEPAuL L REV. 131, 135 (1989))). In at

least one instance, this fiduciary relationship has been defined by statute. The Texas Commercial Bribery
Act provides that a fiduciary commits a felony "if without the consent of his beneficiary, he intentionally
or knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another person-on agreement or
understanding that the benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation to the affairs of his
beneficiary." TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.43(a)(2)(c) (West 1994). The Texas Commercial Bribery Act defines
the term "fiduciary" to include a physician. Id.
26. Much has been written on the conflict of interest inherent in risk sharing arrangements. See,
e.g., MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 136

(1993).
Paying physicians to act as cost-control agents for third parties pits the interests of physicians
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choice-deny care or subsidize the cost of that care. Reassertion of the
corporate practice doctrine would restore the separation of the service delivery
function and the financing function.
Even if risk sharing does not alter physician conduct, it does allow insurance
companies to export some of the cost of doing business to physicians. Because
the risk-sharing arrangements that are prevalent are designed to reward and
punish aggregate behavior, the actions of an individual physician do not have
an effect on the physician's finances." The individual physician remains
powerless to influence the impact of the risk-sharing arrangement. To the
extent that risk sharing shifts costs to physicians, the practice allows insurance
payers to operate as beneficiaries of a hidden subsidy, as a portion of its costs
are underwritten by the medical profession. In this sense, risk sharing is
dishonest.
Risk sharing also creates an additional hidden subsidy for the insurance
industry by allowing payers to distance themselves from explicit rationing
decisions. Risk sharing, in effect, balances the cost containment agenda on the
backs of American physicians.28 This is done by making the physician the
payers' de facto health care rationing agent.29 Therefore, risk sharing masks
the hidden psychic, as well as financial, costs associated with private sector
health care financing.
Unfortunately, the federal government has become a willing participant in
the risk-sharing strategy. The federal government has undermined the
corporate practice doctrine3" and has adopted risk-sharing strategies of its
own.3 The federal government needs to embrace the prohibition on the
corporate practice of medicine in order to prevent insurance companies from

against those of patients. It motivates physicians to consider their own financial interests in
balancing the concerns of payers and patients. And it compromises the ability of physicians
to offer patients disinterested professional advice.
IdL
27. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
28. See Hall, supra note 21, at 716. In his article, which supports some degree of health care
rationing by physicians, Hall states:
The alternatives to internalizing cost constraints in physician's clinical judgments are either
to force patients to make their trade-offs themselves by preventing them from purchasing
insurance or to allow private insurers and employers, driven by profit-making concerns, or
government, driven by budget-deficit concerns, to impute cost constraints explicitly by rule
based oversight of medical practice.
Id.
29. Id
30. See infa notes 62-71 and accompanying text describing impact ofFederal HMO Act of 1974 and
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust enforcement on corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
3 1. The federal government is the payer under two federal programs for health services: Medicare
and Medicaid. Under each of these programs, HMOs may contract with the federal or state government
to accept payment on a prospective basis, rather than a fee-for-service basis. Enrollment in Medicare
HMOs has increased from 400,000 in 1980 to 2.9 million in 1995 (from 4.3% of total HMO enrollment
to 80/.). See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 262, tbl. 136. Enrollment in
Medicaid HMOs rose to 3.3 million in 1995. See id
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shifting the financing function to physicians. Only then can we reveal the true
costs of maintaining the system of private health insurance.
Part II of this Article will examine the premises underlying the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine. This Part will reveal that the doctrine resulted
from a mixture of protectionist motives on the part of organized medicine and
an idealized conception of the physician-patient relationship by the courts.
Part III will examine how federal policy helped lead to the demise of the
doctrine. This Part will reveal that the federal government was more
concerned about cost containment than with preserving an idealized
physician-patient relationship. Part IV will describe the financial risk-shifting
mechanisms that have arisen in response to the need to control health care
costs. Part V will explain how risk sharing is either dangerous because of its
potential to alter the physician-patient relationship, or dishonest because it
merely allows private sector payers to benefit from a hidden public subsidy.
Part VI will examine how a healthy respect for the rationales underlying the
corporate practice doctrine would lead to a prohibition on risk-sharing
arrangements. Part VII then describes the inadequate federal response to risksharing arrangements. Finally, Part VIII describes why the danger and
dishonesty of risk sharing cannot be ameliorated by any means other than a
blanket prohibition on the practice.
II. WHEN TITANS CLASH, ROuND ONE: THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE DOCTRINE VS. COST CONTAINMENT
On July 30, 1972, a group of individuals from San Antonio, Texas
attempted to file articles of incorporation with the Texas Secretary of State for
the purpose of incorporating a nonprofit corporation known as the San
Antonio Community Health Maintenance Association (SACMHA).32 These
individuals intended to use SACMHA to provide medical and health care
programs to Mexican-American and black communities and other low-income
groups in Bexar County, Texas."3 The Articles of Incorporation envisioned
that SACMHA would be empowered to "contract for the employment 3of4
licensed physicians on a salary basis to work for [SACMHA] as employees."
The problem with the proposal to hire physicians as employees on a salary
basis was that none of the incorporators were licensed physicians. Therefore,
SACMHA's Articles of Incorporation were in conflict with Texas statutes
that, as interpreted by Texas courts, prohibited the corporate practice of
medicine,
which included a prohibition on employing physicians on a salary
5
3

basis.

The Texas Secretary of State refused to grant a charter for SACMHA. The
incorporators brought suit in federal court alleging that the state's prohibition

32. S&eGarcia v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 435 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
33. Se id.
34. Id.

35. See id
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on the corporate practice of medicine violated their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment and their freedom of association under the
First Amendment.36 While recognizing the need for low cost medical services,
which the plaintiffs were attempting to address by incorporating SACMHA,37
the district court upheld the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine
in Garcia v. Texas State Board ofMedical Examiners."8
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court relied on various theories that
courts had traditionally used to articulate and enforce the prohibition on the
corporate practice of medicine. The court stated "' [t]o practice a profession
requires something more than the financial ability to hire competent persons
to do the actual work. It can be done only by duly qualified human being, and
to qualify something more3 9 than mere knowledge or skill is essential... No
corporation can qualify.'

Garcia'sreasoning echoed a branch of cases which held that the prohibition
on the corporate practice of medicine was supported by state licensing statutes
that required a license to practice medicine. The reasoning was that
"[c]orporations cannot possibly qualify for a medical license because the
applicant must demonstrate moral character and professional competence.
Corporations, of course, do not have a moral character, cannot attend medical
school, and cannot be tested."' Therefore, corporations could not obtain a
license to practice medicine. The court reasoned that because corporations
could not practice medicine directly, they also could not do so indirectly by
employing licensed physicians."
This reasoning is rather tenuous. The argument that a corporation cannot
practice medicine because it cannot obtain a license is like saying that a
corporation cannot engage in trucking because a corporation cannot obtain
a driver's license. 42 The argument that a corporation cannot practice

36. Seeid.
37. Seeid at 439-40 (noting a "grave shortage of doctors" and a need for "more medical care at a
less expensive cost").
38. Id. at 440.
39. Id. at 438 (quoting Dr.Allison, Dentistv. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799 (1935)) (alteration in
original).
40. Hall, Institutional Control, supra note 12, at 512; see also, Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 465

(noting that "[c]ourts that derive a rule against corporate practice from statute requiring license hold that
a corporation's non-personal nature prevents it from meeting the qualifications of the licensure statute and

therefore prevents it from practicing medicine").
41. See Hall, Corporate Pacfzi, supra note 12, at 3-10 (noting that such courts reason that corporations
which employ physicians violated licensing laws by reason of the agency law notion that acts of the
employees are attributable to the employer).

42. Id. at 3-20. Hall concludes that there is not really a sound statutory basis for the corporate
practice doctrine. Few statutes specifically address the issue, and courts have pieced together an implication
based on reasoning that Hall characterizes as either formalistic or obvious sophistry. To emphasize his
point, Hall observes:
The argument is no more sound than the argument, say, that corporations who hire truck

drivers are engaged in driving without a license because:
The actions ofdrivers hired by a corporation are attributed to the corporation;
an eyesight examination is required for a driver's license;

CORPORATE PRACTICE OFMEDICLIE
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medicine because it cannot obtain a license represents a judicial attempt to
avoid making public policy. 43 It reflects one line of reasoning that courts used

in the corporate practice cases-a somewhat tortured reading of a licensing
4
law to achieve the court's rather thinly veiled public policy agenda.
The Garciacourt also noted that "[t] he Texas legislature seeks to preserve
the vitally important doctor-patient relationship, and prevent possible abuses
resulting from lay person control of a corporation employing licensed
physicians on a salaried basis.

,4 5

The court reflected:

While it is no doubt true that this nation faces a grave shortage of
doctors, is the panacea to be found in the formation of non-profit
layman corporations? We think not. It appears to the Court that not
only is such a corporation fraught with practical and ethical
considerations, but may well represent a backward step in the
legislative protections it has taken so long to achieve. Without
licensed, professional doctors on Boards of Directors, who and what
criteria govern the selection of medical and paramedical staff
members? To whom does the doctor owe his first duty-the patient
or corporation?... Who is to dictate the medical and administrative
procedures to be followed? Where do budget considerations end and
patient care begin?6
These statements underscore the public policy concerns that courts
have used to support the prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine. Lay control over the physician's professional judgment,
commercial exploitation of the medical practice, and division of the
physician's loyalty between patient and employer are rationales that
courts have advanced to prohibit the corporate practice of medicine.47
Implicit in these public policy concerns was a belief that the profit
motives of lay persons should not interfere with the sanctity of the
physician-patient relationship. As one commentator noted:
The fidelity of the physician-patient relationship has long been viewed
as crucial to the practice of medicine. The introduction of a third
party into that relationship could divert the physician's loyalty from
the patient to the third party compensating the physician.
Consequently, the physician might be more concerned with the

*

corporations cannot take an eye exam;

*

therefore, a corporation that hires drivers is guilty of driving without a license.

Id at 3-20-3-21.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Garcia v. Texas State Bd. Med. of Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 438-39 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
46. Id. at 439-40.
47. SeeChase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 467.
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interests of the corporation's investors than with the interests of the
physician's patient.'
Thus, the court's opinion in Garciarelied upon the traditional grounds
upon which the judiciary had supported (and created) the prohibition on
the corporate practice of medicine. Garcia is instructive because it
involves the application of the doctrine in the context of the modem
concern with health care cost containment. In Garcia, the court's
upholding the doctrine had the effect of preventing the implementation
of an innovative health care delivery system that would both contain
health care cost and expand accessibility of services. It was the fact that
the doctrine presented an obstacle to such cost containment measures
that hastened its demise.
III. WHEN TITANS CLASH, ROuND TWO: THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE DOCTRINE VS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine was a creature of the
organized medical profession, state legislatures, and the courts.4 9 The
doctrine is credited with helping to raise the standards of the medical
profession and protecting the public from quackery.50 It is credited with
doing much to establish the sovereignty of physicians." However,
viewed in another light, the doctrine was foisted upon the unsuspecting
public by organized medicine to preserve physicians' financial wellbeing by protecting physicians from competition. 2
When the
protectionist aspects of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine came
into conflict with the federal concern about the increasing cost of
medical services, the federal government responded by undermining the
doctrine.
The prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine found its
genesis in ethical codes of organized medicine. The ethical code was

48. Id. at 470.
49. See
generall id.
at 445.
50. SeeGarcia, at 437-38. ("Historically, such remedial statutes have been adopted as a result of
hindsight and in the wake ofa stream of public abuse at the hands of entrepreneur medicine man purveying
his snake oil elixir.").
51. See STARR, supra
note 12, at 199-232. This section describes the organized medical profession's
resistance of corporate control between 1900 and 1920. This resistance contributed to maintaining the
professional sovereignty of physicians.
52. Chase-ubitz,supra
note 12, at 457-58 (noting that "contract practice" and "corporate practice"
threatened organized medicine's monopolistic designs by creating competition); see also STARR, supra note
12, at 215-16 ("Doctors opposed corporate enterprise in medical practice not only because they wanted
to preserve their autonomy, but also because they wanted to prevent the emergence of any intermediary
or third party that might keep for itself the profits potentially available to the practice of medicine.").
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part of organized medicine's early effort to "establish the preeminence
of the regular medical profession in the provision of health care by
imposing higher standards on the profession and by distinguishing it
from sectarianism and quackery."53 The young profession was aided in
this endeavor by state legislatures that adopted licensing statutes which
prohibited the practice of medicine without obtaining a medical license,
and judicial interpretations of such statutes."
As part of the effort to distinguish physicians from pretenders, the
ethical code promulgated by the American Medical Association (AMA)
consistendy and jealously guarded against inroads into physicians'
autonomy. The AMA's ethical codes initially prohibited physicians
from engaging in financial arrangements that made it "impossible to
render adequate service" and that "interfere[d] with reasonable
competition among the physicians of a community."55 The AMA
revised its ethical code in 1934 by the addition of the following
proscription:
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional
attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group or
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under
terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary
or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual
employing him. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at
large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine
and the welfare of
56
the people, and is against sound public policy.
In other words, the ethical code prevented physicians from taking
salaried positions with lay organizations or splitting professional fees
with lay organizationsY
As one commentator noted:
Through the development and enforcement of an ethical code, the
AMA was able to organize regular physicians and distinguish them
from less reputable practitioners. By procuring passage of licensing
legislation, the regular medical profession began to limit competition
and raise the quality of practitioners. With successes in educational
reform, the AMA further controlled competition and advanced
physicians' expertise. By the early twentieth century, the AMA
brought public respect and greater financial reward to physicians and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 449.
See id at 464-69.
Id. at 459 (quoting In re AMA, 94 F.T.C. 701, 10I1 n.59).
Id. at462 n.113.
Se id at 462-63.
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established the
regular medical profession's virtual control over
58
medical care.

As noted above, the AMA, the state legislatures, and the courts
created and maintained the prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine. The federal government was not concerned about the
manner in which medical services were organized and delivered until
the 1960s. Prior to that point, the federal government was not
significantly involved in health care, either through the licensing of
providers or through regulation.59 This changed in 1965 with the
introduction of the Medicare program.60 With the introduction of the
Medicare program, the federal government became significantly
6
involved in health care as the major purchaser of health care services. '
As a major purchaser of health services, the federal government
quickly became concerned about the cost of those services. This
concern signaled the beginning of the end of the prohibition on the
corporate practice of medicine. Two federal responses to health care
cost containment undermined the continuing viability of the prohibition
on the corporate practice of medicine. These were actions by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its enforcement of antitrust laws
and the enactment of the Federal HMO Act.
The FTC determined that the AMA's promulgation of ethical
opinions concerning the corporate practice of medicine constituted
anticompetitive conduct by the profession.62 It enjoined the AMA from
the publication and dissemination of ethical codes that proscribed

58. Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
59. Federal involvement in health care expenditures began in the 1930s with the introduction of
legislation to provide medical services for recipients of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Title
V of the Social Security Act of 1935 provided grants to states, for maternal and child health programs, and
Tide VI authorized grants to assist state and other political subdivisions "in establishing and maintaining
adequate public health services." WIIAM L.KISSiCK, MEDICINE'S DILEMMAs 77 (1994). The Hospital
Survey and Construction Act of 1946, known as the Hill-Burton program, directed funds towards the

development of hospitals, public health centers, and other facilities. See idat 78-79. The government
supported research via the establishment of the National Institute of Health and the National Cancer
Institute in 1937, the National Heart Institute in 1948, and the National Institute of Mental Health in
1949. See id at 78. In 1956, Congress authorized support for the training of public health personnel for
programs established under Title VI of the Social Security Act. See id at 79.

60. Se Title XVII of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96).

61. With the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, federal expenditures for health care rose from $9.5
billion in 1965 to 841.5 billion in 1975. See Sven Steinmo &Jon Watts, Its The Institution, Stupid' Wy
CompriuiNatinalHealth InsuranmAkeys Fais inAni 20J. HEALTH POL POL'Y AND L 329, 357 n.20
(1995). By 1993, this figure had risen to 8281 billion, or 32% of the total $884 billion spent on health care.
See U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 31.
62. SeeInreAMA,94F.T.C. 701 (1979).
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physicians from entering into various types of financial arrangements."
This would remove an effective method for enforcing the prohibition on
the corporate practice of medicine. 4
The AMA's ethical codes were an effective means of enforcing the
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine.65 However, the
ethical codes never had the force of law. Notwithstanding the FTC
action, legislation and judicial opinions still remained as obstacles to the
employment of physicians by corporations. 6 In 1973, Congress
removed some of these obstacles by passing the Federal HMO Act.67
The purpose of the Act was to promote the development of HMOs as
a means for controlling health care costs and increasing access to health
care.68 The legislation preempts state laws requiring that all of the
board of directors of an HMO be physicians.69
These two federal actions hastened the demise of the corporate
practice doctrine.70 Legal commentators have applauded this action
because the doctrine stood as an obstacle to the development of
innovative health care delivery systems needed to control health care
costs and increase access to care.7" Unfortunately, dismantling the
doctrine also contributed to the development of subtle (Machiavellian?)
disruptions in the physician-patient relationship.
IV. RISK SHARING: A HEALTH CARE FINANCING INNOVATION
As cost containment came to the foreground as a predominant issue
in health care, innovative strategies arose for dealing with the cost of
health care.72 Physicians were key actors in the health care delivery
system and were identified as the prime actors in the decision to

63. See id.
64. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 458-64 (relating to the role of the American Medical
Association (AMA) ethical pronouncements of enforcement of corporate practice doctrine).
65. &eid.
66. See id at 464-67 (indicating role of state licensing laws statutes and judicial interpretation of those

laws.)
67. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L No. 93-100 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300e. (1996)).
68. See
S. REP. 93-1279 (1973), reprntdin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N 3033.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)(l)(B) (1996).
70. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 478 ("[T]he recent abolition of these ethical restrictions [by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)] greatly weakens the foundation upon which the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine was built.") and 482 ("[T]he HMO legislation implicitly preempts the common law
prohibition ... and isa sweeping federal policy statement in favor of a corporate-based competitive health
market. The legislation eschews a medical economy dominated by independent, fee-for-service
practitioners.").
71. See id. at 488.
72. See inf-a notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
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consume health care resources.73 Therefore, many of the cost
containment strategies were aimed at controlling physicians' behavior.74
As the payers sought more effective methods to contain costs, they
adopted strategies that became more and more intrusive into the
physician-patient relationship. This moved the physician-patient
relationship further away from the relationship idealized by courts that
espoused enforcement of the prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine. These courts had envisioned that the physician-patient
relationship was a fiduciary relationship which should not be
encumbered by lay profit motives. Eventually, the payers achieved the
ultimate coup by realigning the physicians' financial interest to coincide
with the payers' financial interests. The payers accomplished this
fundamental realignment by risk sharing.7 Risk sharing involves
shifting some
of the cost of providing health care from the payers to the
76
physicians.
The cost of medical services increased at an alarming rate between
1970 through the early 1990s." Medical inflation generally outstripped
the general inflation rate and health care consumed a greater and
greater portion of the gross national product. 8 One theory explaining

73. See Lu, supra note 19, at 528; see alro infa notes 82-117 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 82-117 and accompanying text.
75. ee RODWIN, supra note 26, at 139-40. Rodwin notes:
Most HMOs ...use payment incentives to tie the interests of physicians to the financial
goals of the organization. They frequently make physicians-particularly primary care
physicians-bear part of the financial risk for providing services, so that their incomes
decrease as the cost of treating patients rises.
Id.
76. See id
77. Between 1970 and 1994 the total expenditures for health care rose from $73.2 billion to $949.4
billion. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 239, tbl. 114. This represents

more than a twelve-fold increase. By comparison, the increase for total gross domestic product was only
seven-fold from $1,035.6 billion to $6,931.3 billion. Se id
78. The average general inflation index and medical inflation index between 1970 and 1994 was:
All Items

Medical Care

1970-1975

6.8

6.9

1975.1980

8.9

9.5

1980-1985

5.5

8.7

1985-1990

4.0

7.5

1990-1995

3.1

6.3

Id. at 241, tbl. 116.
The percentage ofthe gross national product (GNP) represented by expenditures for medical services
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the persistence of increasing health care expenditures was that it resulted
from the system for financing health care. Health insurance reimbursed
health care providers for services on the basis of retrospective cost.79
After the provision of the services, the provider would submit a bill to
the insurance company, and if the bill did not appear to be out of line
with industry norms, the insurance company paid the bill. There was
no requirement for advance pricing or advance approval for most
medical procedures, including high cost in-patient hospital services.8"
In this system, the physician directed the consumption of health care
resources without external limitations. The patient was not concerned
about the costs because the insurer made the payments. The insurer
was not concerned with the cost because it would be able to pass the cost
along in the form of higher premiums paid by the employers.
Therefore, the bills were passed along through the system and no one
had an interest in containing health care delivery costs."'
The physician reigned supreme in this system. The physician alone
had the expertise necessary to determine what medical treatment a
patient required. It was, therefore, the physicians who directed the
consumption of health care resources.8 2 The physicians' financial
interest under the fee-for-service system was aligned with more, rather
than less, consumption of medical resources.8" The more services that
the physician determined the patient needed, the more the patient
received and the more the physician was paid.
Recognizing the physicians' role in health care consumption
decisions, the insurance industry and the payers adopted cost
containment strategies aimed at the physicians' decision-making. These
strategies, known as managed care, included utilization reviewrequirements that the physicians desiring to conduct a test or provide a
procedure needed to obtain preapproval from the payer." Utilization

rose from 7.1% in 1970 to 13.7% in 1994. Id. at 241, tbl.! 14. By comparison, in 1993 when U.S.
expenditures for medical care represented 13.6% of the GNP, the percentage of the GNP spent on medical
2
care in other developed countries was as follows: Canada (10. /6), France (9.81/9), Germany (8.60/), Japan
(7.30/a), and the United Kingdom (7.1%). See id at 240, tbl. 115. It is also clear that expenditures per capita
in the U.S. exceed those of other nations. See id In 1993 the U.S. spent $3,331 per capita, while other
developed countries' spending was as follows: Canada (81,971), France (81,835), Germany (81,815),Japan
($1,495), United Kingdom ($1,213). See id.
79. See Randall, supra note 4, at 14-15.
80. Sagenerayid at 15-16.
81. S id at 15 & n.50; seealso Gregg Easterbrook, The Rwoiutin n Medicine Cae, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
26, 1987, at 43 (describing the "pass along" feature of health care financing).
82. See Lu, supra note 19, at 528.
83. See Randall, supra note 4, at 15; Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 972.
84. See Mary R. Kohler, When the Whole Evceds the Sum oflir Pas: Why Esting UiiationManagement
PracticesDon'tMeasure Up, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63 (1992).
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review included preadmission review or precertification for inpatient
hospital services or diagnostic tests, 85 concurrent review, 86 and required
second opinion for elective surgical procedures 87 and gatekeepers. 8
In addition, insurers and payers also introduced alternative
arrangements for health care delivery. The most traditional was the
HMO. 9 HMOs are distinguished from traditional insurance in that
they represent a combination of the insurance function with the service
provider function. HMOs collect premiums and arrange for the
provision
care services by employing or contracting with
physicians.'of health
HMOs attempt to address the cost of health care by: (1)
emphasizing preventative care, (2) extensive utilization management,
and (3)alternative fee structures with physicians.9' An additional form
of managed care is the preferred provider organization (PPO) 2 Under
a PPO arrangement, a select group of physicians contracts to provide
medical services to patients at discounted fees.9 The PPO also typically
combines some form of utilization management in order to control the
consumption of health care resources. 4
Utilization management proved to be an unsatisfactory method of
controlling health care expenditures. It added an additional layer of
bureaucracy to the health care delivery system. 5 It did not actually save
any money. Also, physicians purportedly hated utilization review

85. See id at 1070. Preadmission certification occurs prior to a patient's admission to the hospital
for nonemergency treatment.
86. See id. Concurrent review occurs while the patient is still in the hospital. Under concurrent
review, the payer determines the patient's need for continuing hospital in-patient services.
87. See Randall, supra note 4, at 28.
88. See id
89. See DianaJoseph Bearden & BryanJ. Maedgen, Energing Theoris of Liability in the
Managed Health
Cae/ndas, 47 BAYLOR L REv. 285, 291 (1995). In this article, the authors note that the term "HMO"
was coined in the 1970s but the concept was created in the 1920s. They also describe the establishment
of Kaiser-Permencnte in the mid-1930s. See
ids Kaiser was established to provide for the health care needs
of Kaiser employees who worked on the Grande Coulee Dam in Washington State. Seeid As of 1996,
Kaiser was still in operation and listed as one of the nation's 43 largest HMOs with membership of
approximately 3.5 million in Hawaii, Califomia, Georgia, Ohio, the mid-Adantic, and the Northwest. See
Ellyn Spragins, Does tour HMO Stack Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1996, at 61-62 (survey rating 43 of
America's largest HMOs). Kaiser represents a traditional HMO in that it both ow~ns hospitals and employs
the physicians who serve its patients. Se RODWIN, spra note 26, at 138 ('The first HMOs, now called staff
modelHMOs, owned medical care facilities and employed a group of physicians on salary.").
90. See
Randall, supra note 4, at 20 & n.73.
91. Sw Bearden & Maedgen, upra note 89, at 294-95.
92. Sw Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 971.
93. Seeid
94. See
id
95. Seid
96. Se; e.g., Kohler, supra note 84, at 1103 (indicating that although some researchers report a
potential saving of six percent per employee, other researchers criticize the methodologies of such studies);
see also
Am HMOs thAnser?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1992, at 519, 520 (noting that calculation of cost
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because it represented an intrusion into their professional autonomy. 97
as an
Because of these concerns, utilization review has been criticized
98
ineffective means to limit medically unnecessary services.
In order to effectively address the cost problem, the payers needed to
co-opt physicians.9 9 The payers could achieve this by shifting some of
the financial risk for the cost of health care onto the physicians. Because
physicians made the decisions regarding consumption of health care
services, if the decision to consume would have a negative financial
consequence for the physician, perhaps the physician would consume
fewer services by ordering fewer diagnostic tests and not referring the
patient for in-patient services.' 0 As one commentator observes:
[T]he control strategy that will work best is to influence physicians to
change their practice styles, to acquire a new treatment philosophy,
through a motivational force that orients them toward a more
conservative end of the acceptable range of variation in medical
The most effective motivational force is likely to be
practice ....
financial incentive. If fee-for-service or cost-based reimbursement is
seen as the source of health care's excess, reversing financial incentives
to reward physicians for less rather than more treatment can be
expected to change practice styles across the board.'0
Risk sharing appears in two forms: (1) payment on the basis of
capitation,10 2 and (2) fee withholding.'0 3 Payers may use these forms of
risk sharing separately or in combination with one another. 4 Under
capitation reimbursement, in lieu of receiving a payment for each
encounter with a patient, the physician receives a flat monthly payment
per each patient assigned to the physician's care.'0 5 The payment is the

savings from utilization may be overstated due to method ofcalculating the savings and that administrative
costs associated with utilization review may further detract from the savings); THOMAS M. BURTON, Second
Opinion: Finns That PFirnseLower Medical Bills May Increase Them, WALL ST.J., July 28, 1992, atAl (noting
that review by Inspector General of the U.S. Health & Human Services Department concluded that the
government had paid $13.3 million to utilization review companies to save $1.4 million in possibly
unnecessary surgery).

97. See Kohler, supra note 84, at 1077 ("Physicians are generally the most adamant opponents of
concurrent review. They argue that it interferes with their clinical decisions, and places them in a tenuous
position.").
98. Segenera/y id.
99.
100.

See Hall, InstitutionalControl, supra note 12, at 482-83.
Semi

101. Id Hall notes that in Great Britain, physicians adopt a far less aggressive style of medicine due
to severe resource constraints. See id
102. See Randall, supra note 4, at 30.
103. Se id
104. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 23, at 1745 (noting that 67% of surveyed HMOs combined
capitation and withholding).
105. See MARK V. PAULEY ET AL, PAYING PHYSICIANS: OPTIONS FOR CONTROLUING COST,
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same regardless of how often or whether the patient utilizes the
physician's services during the month. Therefore, the physician is at risk
that patients' demand for services may exceed the fee-for-service value
of the services. The demand may require the physician to expand the
physician's office hours or add additional staff.' 6
Under fee withholding, the payer withholds a percentage of the
physician's compensation (either the fee for services or the capitation
payments). The payer distributes the withheld fees to the physician at
the end of a specified period of time if the physician's performance
meets certain criteria which the payer establishes. The performance
criteria are typically related to the costs for expensive medical treatment,
in particular, expenditures for referrals to specialists and expenditures
for in-patient hospital treatment.107
For example, the payer may withhold twenty percent of the
physician's fees earned during a month. The payer will allocate the
withheld fees to a referral- and hospital-services risk pool.' The payer
allocates funds for referral services and hospital services in accordance
with a budget for such services.0 9 The payer determines the risk pool
budgets by using actuarial data that indicate the average cost for such
services." 0 The payer pays for such services from the referral- and
hospital-services risk pool."' If the payer's actual expenditures exceed
the budget for such services, the payer applies the physician's withheld
fees to the payment of the referral services and in-patient hospital
services." 2 The physicians forfeit the withheld fees." 3 If the payer
actually expends less than the budgeted amounts, the physicians will be
entitled to recoup some or all of their withheld fees." 4 In effect, the fee
withholding places a designated percentage of the physician's income at
risk for health care services that are not provided by the physician. The
more services the physicians utilize, the less likely the physicians will
recoup the withheld fees.
Risk sharing has become increasingly popular as a health care costcontainment mechanism." 5 It is the financing mechanism of choice in
VOLUME, AND INTENSITY OF SERVICES 101 (1992).
106. See Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 973 (describing how under a system of capitation in which
physicians are only responsible for their own services, it is only physicians' time that is at risk).

107. See, e.g., Hiliman, supra note 23, at 1744.
108. ee id.
109. See id
110. &eid
111.
112.

Seeid
ee id

113. Seid.
114. Seeid
115. Se, e.g., Alan L Hillman, et al., HMOa1
Mwgers viezas on FanwdIallncenmvtr & Qualiy, 10 HEALTH

1998]

CORPORA TE PRACTICE OFMEDICINE

507

so-called mature managed care markets." 6 Although originally a
creature of the private sector, risk sharing has also begun to take hold in
the federal programs, Medicare and Medicaid, albeit in an indirect
fashion.117

Risk sharing would not have withstood a challenge based on the
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine. Risk sharing violates
the corporate practice doctrine's prohibition on physicians sharing their
fees with lay persons. Under capitation, the physician no longer sets a
fee. The managed care organization establishes the fee. Under
withholding, the managed care entity retains physicians' fees for
application against its own costs. These arrangements would violate the
corporate practice doctrine on their face. Further, it would not be
difficult for a court to articulate how these practices also violate the
principles inherent in the corporate practice doctrine-division of
loyalty, exploitation of medicine, and physician autonomy." 8
AFF. 207, 208 (1991) ("Approximately one-half of HMOs pay primary care physicians by capitation...
60 percent... use a withhold account."); see also RODWIN, supra note 26, at 140 ("Risk sharing is the norm
in HMOs.").
116. See, e.g., The Advisory Board, CAPITATIONI: THE NEW AMERICAN MEDICINE 38 (on file with
the Unzim1 ofCinmLnato Review) ("Capitation is largely a West Coast phenomenon."). The West Coast
(California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona) has been characterized as an area with high penetration of
managed care. Se Press Release from KPMG Peat Marwick, Managed CareStudy (June 1, 1995) (on file with
the Unki
of CincinnatiLaw Review) (describing Los Angeles and San Francisco, California and Portland,
Oregon as cities with high penetration of managed care).
117. Medicare and Medicaid do not directly enter into risk-sharing arrangements with physicians.
However, under the two programs, the federal government has authorized Medicare and Medicaid HMOs.
Under Medicaid, states have pursued managed care approaches for Medicaid recipients pursuant to waivers
under §§1115 and 1915 of Tide XIX of the Social Security Act. See William A. Rivera, A FuAreforMedicaid
Managed Carr The Lssons of California'sSan Mateo County, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 105, 111-12 (1995-96).
The number of Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care plans increased to eight million in 1994,
covering twenty-four percent of the Medicaid eligible population. See Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission, Report and Recommendations to Congress, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,384, 29,402 (1995) [hereinafter
Prospective Payment].
Under Medicare, § 1876 of Tide XVIII of the Social Security Act authorizes the provision of services
for Medicare beneficiaries by managed care entities. See Health Care Financing Administration, Health
and Human Services, 61 Fed. Reg. 69,034, 69,034 (1996). Enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in
Medicare HMOs rose from three percent of the total Medicare population in 1988 to almost five percent
in 1994. See Prospective Payment, supra, at 29,410.
Under either Medicaid or Medicare, HMOs may assume risk by receiving compensation based on
capitation payments. See Health Care Financing Administration, 61 Fed. Reg. at 69,035. These entities
must have procedures in place to control the cost of health services, including risk sharing or financial
incentives with providers. See 42 C.F.R. 417.103(b) (1996).
118. See, e.g., Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 481 ("[l nherent in the HMO structure is the risk that
a physician's loyalty will be divided between employer and patient, a risk no less evident in the HMO
structure than in the corporate structures held illegal under the corporate practice doctrine decades
earlier."); see also ShevaJ. Sanders, Regulating ManagedCare Plans Under CurrentLaw: A Radical Reversion To
EstablishedDoctrine, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 73, 86 (1991).
A physician's ... participation in an arrangement whereby she is offered financial incentives
to limit access to health care services, at best, raises legitimate concerns about her ability to
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V. THE DANGER AND DISHONESTY OF RISK SHARING

An analysis of risk sharing indicates that it is either dangerous because
it influences physician behavior, or dishonest because it creates a hidden
subsidy for the private insurance industry by allowing the industry to
export part of its costs to physicians. Risk sharing could significantly
alter the physician-patient relationship in very detrimental ways." 9 It

could achieve this by destroying the traditional alignment between
patients' and physicians' interests. This could cause harm to patients
who are injured as a result of decisions influenced by financial concerns.
The potential for such problems is more readily apparent in a system of
individualized risk sharing in which one physician is required to assume
the risk for that physician's own patients. However, it is unlikely that
individualized risk sharing will prevail. The more direct the relationship

between a negative financial inducement and damage to a patient, the
more likely is the prospect for liability. 2 ° Payers tend to adopt pooled
risk-sharing arrangements in which groups of physicians will assume the
risk for patient care.12

Pooled risk sharing may or may not alter individual physician
conduct. Pooled risk sharing does, however, allow payers to shift the
cost of health care onto physicians. In pooled risk-sharing systems
physicians are allowed to exercise their best professional judgment, but
the physicians are, in effect, required to pay for exercising that
judgment. The cause and effect relationship between the individual
physician's decision and the negative financial consequences for the
physician is ameliorated, however, bdcause the pooled risk-sharing
arrangement rewards and punishes aggregate behavior, not individual
behavior. Pooled forms of risk sharing are merely a dishonest means to

export the cost of financing health care needs onto the physicians. It

think only of her patients interests and, at worst, means that she has agreed to allow a third
party to exercise control and direction over her professional judgment.
Id.
119. See, e.g., RODWIN, supra note 26, at 140 ("Such incentives encourage physicians to ask themselves
'How much will this cost me?' before providing or recommending medical services. As a result, physicians
may recommend too little medical care.").
120. See mfta notes 216-28 and accompanying text. An analysis of the cases in which plaintiffs have
sued managed care entities and physicians have alleged that the financial incentives imposed on physicians
contributed to the patient's harm, indicates that the courts were swayed by the lack of evidence of a direct
causal relationship when they decided to rule against the plaintiff. In the one case in which such a causal
relationship was clear, the court cleared the way for the plaintiff to go to trial. For a description of facts in
Bush v. Dake, see supra note 2.
121. See inyfa notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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also allows payers to relieve themselves of the potential liability
associated with denying care in utilization review disputes.' 22
An example of individualized risk sharing would be an arrangement
between a payer and an individual primary care physician pursuant to
which the physician receives capitation payments and also has a
percentage of such capitation payments withheld by the payer for the
payer to apply against the payer's expenditures for that physician's
referrals to specialists or admission of patients for in-patient hospital
care. Under such a system, there would be a direct financial
consequence to the physician each time the physician referred a patient
to a specialist or admitted a patient to a hospital. At the end of the year,
if the physician's referrals and hospital admissions caused the payer's
expenditures to exceed the budget that the payer established for the
physician, the physician would forfeit the withheld fees.' 23
Individualized risk sharing alters the traditional alignment between
124
the physician's financial interests and the patient's best interests.
Under the traditional fee-for-service payment system, in a marginal
case, if the issue was whether to conduct an additional test or provide a
particular procedure, the payment structure arguably aligned the
physician's interest with that of the patient. There was no cost to the
patient for conducting the additional test or recommending the
additional procedure and there was no financial disadvantage for the
physician. Under an individualized risk-sharing system, the physician's
fiduciary duty to the patient may be antagonistic to the physician's
financial interests because referring the patient for specialized services
has a financial consequence for the physician.
Another important aspect of this individualized risk sharing is that it
shifts the responsibility for rationing health care services onto
physicians.' 25 This means that the payers can effectively remove

122. See infta notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Hall, InstitutionalControl, supra note 12, at 484.

There are a number of variations on this theme. For example, one IPA [independent
practice association] established an account for each physician consisting of a percentage
of the premiums paid by that physicians patients. Each physician received half of any
surplus ... and contributed half of any deficit, up to ten percent of the... [physician's]

HMO reserve.
Id.
124. Seegeneral!/ RODWIN, supra note 26.
125. See Hall, supra note 21, at 758 (examining ethical issues that arise when physicians are induced
to engage in rationing through financial incentive arrangements); see also Alexander Capron, Contanming
Health Care Costs: Et/ucaland Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physidans, 36 CASE W. REs.

L. REv. 708, 748-49 (noting that "reimbursement plans that place physicians ... at financial risk are
intended to ally physicians with society's new position that many medical interventions are not costbeneficial and ought to be avoided").
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themselves from responsibility and liability for health care rationing
12 6
while enjoying the cost savings resulting from physicians' decisions.
In effect, while the physician absorbs part of the financial costs of health
care, the physician also absorbs the psychic cost of rationing. As
explained by Alan Hillman:
[I]n the absence of a social mandate that specifies how resources
should be used, physicians should not be required to translate what
society is "telling us in many different ways" to the point of making
allocation decisions at the level of the individual doctor-patient
interaction. Furthermore, these decisions certainly should not 1be
27
made by virtue of what is in the provider's best financial interest.
In this sense, individualized risk sharing allows payers to export some of
the social cost of financing health care-making hard allocation
decisions.
Individualized risk sharing is a very convenient procedure for
containing health care costs. It is also very dangerous. It relies on the
cause and effect relationship between a physician's actions and the
financial impact of those actions in order to conscript the physician to
the task of cost containment, the hope being that the physician will not
order medically unnecessary services because it is not in the physician's
financial interest.
At this point, the danger of risk sharing to patients is apparently
128
largely speculative. Despite growing attention in the popular media,
empirical research has not revealed any correlation between risk-sharing
arrangements and any decline in quality of care. 129 This may be
attributable to the fact that the typical risk-sharing arrangement is not
designed to produce a direct causal relationship between an individual
126. See McGraw, supra note 7, at 1836 ("The clandestine character of these incentives also inhibits
the ability to link an adverse outcome to the use of financial incentive arrangements.").
127. Alan L Hillman, Conaspondmce, Gatekeepers and Cost-Contaiersin HMOs, 318 NEW ENG.J. MED.
1699, 1700 (1988).
128. S*, e.g., Haney & Bayles, supra note 2, at 3. The authors related the following stories: a patient
with kidney failure who suffered cardiac arrest after his HMO primary care physician refused to refer him
to a specialist, a patient not referred for services that would have detected cervical cancer, a patient with
history of manic depression taken off medication by his HMO physician, a patient with lump in breast told
by HMO physician not to worry about it and subsequently found to have spreading cancer. See also Olmos,
supra note 8, at Al (relating lawsuit over death of colon cancer victim based on HMO physician's delay in
conducting tests).
129. Mary Ann Bobinski, supra note 25, at 307-09. On the other hand, surveys do reveal a
correlation between patient satisfaction with the services received and the compensation arrangement
between the physician and insurer. Consamw Reports conducted a survey that found a significant relationship
between member satisfaction and the way primary care doctors in an HMO were paid. SeeAre HMOs the
Anmwer?, supra note 96, at 519. HMOs that compensated physicians on a fee-for-service basis have tended
to rate higher in member satisfaction than HMOs that either capitated physicians' payments or subjected
physicians to fee withholds. See id at 523.

1998]

CORPORA TE PRACTICE OFMEDICINE

physician's actions and a negative financial consequence to that
physician. Risk-sharing systems are typically designed to punish and
reward the aggregate conduct of a group of physicians through pooled
risk-sharing arrangements. 0

Insurers establish pooled risk-sharing arrangements through two
general methods. Under the first method, the payer may enter into an
agreement with an organized group of physicians, either a group
practice or an independent practice association.'' Under this system,
the group may be subject to a risk-sharing arrangement, for example,
the group may accept capitation payments and be responsible for
compensating the individual physicians from the capitation payments.3 2
Under the second method, the payer may pool risk by entering into
agreements with individual physicians, but placing withheld fees at risk

for the performance of the entire group of physicians.' For example,
although the insurer enters into individual capitation agreements with
physicians, it might withhold fees from the individual physicians and

condition the return of such withheld fees based on the expenditures for
referral to specialists and admissions to hospitals by all of the primary
contract with the managed care entity in a
care physicians under
134
geographic region.
Under either of the pooled risk-sharing arrangements, there is nothing
that the individual physician can do to recoup the physician's withheld
fees. Therefore, pooled risk-sharing arrangements arguably decrease
the potential realignment of the individual physician's interests vis-A-vis
the patient's interests and, theoretically, have less potential for harm.
130. See Alan L Hillman et al., ContrachidArrangmnt betemn HMOs adPrimayCarePhysians: ThreeTered HMOs and Risk Pools, 30 MEDICAL CARE 136 (1992). The authors attempt to refine the analysis of
financial incentives paid to physicians. They note that previous studies failed to distinguish between twotiered and three-tiered arrangements. See id Under a two-tiered arrangement, the HMO contracts directly
with the individual physicians. See id. Under a three-tiered arrangement, the HMO contracts with some
middle tier entity which in turn contracts with the individual's physicians. See id One point of this study
is that the actual percentage of individual physicians actually compensated on the basis of capitation might
be overstated because some of the capitation payments reported were actually being paid to a middle-tier
entity. See id at 141. For the purposes of risk sharing, it would be the middle-tier entity and not an
individual physician who was engaged in risk sharing. See id. at 140. They note, "in three-tiered HMOs
the intervening entities may change the contractual arrangements so that the financial incentives and other
obligations do not directly impact the physicians." Id. at 137. Approximately 35% of the HMOs that
responded to the survey were three-tiered HMOs. e id. at 142 tbl.2. Further, in accordance with the
survey, IPA risk pools only involve one physician in 15% of the cases. e id at 144, 143 tbl.6.
131. See id. at 138 (noting that the HMO contract may be with the medical staff of a hospital, a
physician group, or the entity formed for payment purposes).
132. Seeid. at 140.
133. HMOs that contract directly with individual physicians are referred to as having two tiers. &e
id at 137. In such two-tiered systems, 44% involved risk pools that cover all physicians in the HMO. See
id at 144 tbl.6. Only 19% of such systems engage in risk pooling on an individual basis. See id.
134. Seeid.at 140.
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However, this is only true to the extent that the group of physicians do
not have power to enforce conduct in order to meet group goals and to
the extent that risk sharing does not influence the group's exercise of
power over the individual physician. Depending on the degree of power
that the group exercises over the individual, the group can establish the
same performance criteria that the payer uses and thereby subject
individual physicians
to the same pressures as individualized risk-sharing
5
arrangements.IS

To the extent that the group of physicians covered by a pooled risksharing arrangement has no control over the conduct of individual
physicians in the pool, pooled risk sharing is merely a dishonest means
to require physicians to subsidize part of the insurance industry's cost of
doing business. To the extent that the law allows this to continue, the
law provides a hidden subsidy for the private health insurance field.
This is the beauty of pooled risk-sharing arrangements-the system is
designed so that the relationship between the physician's conduct and
the system is so tenuous that it escapes scrutiny;13 6 yet, the system
effectively allows the insurers to export part of their costs to the
physicians.
Another attraction of risk sharing for payers is that it potentially
renders the conflicts inherent in utilization review moot. Utilization
review is criticized for being ineffective and cumbersome." 7 However,
utilization review is also dangerous for payers because it is explicit.
Under utilization review, the physician is not required to abandon the
physician's traditional role. Utilization review merely means that in
order to obtain what the physician believes is in the patient's best
interest, the physician might need to become an advocate for the patient
against the payer's utilization review program.3 8 This creates a
potential ground of liability for the payer who denies care to a patient
based on a utilization review decision. In Wickline v. State. 9 and Wilson

135. See id at 146 (noting that managerial control affected by peer pressure and group norms might
cause individual members to change behavior, even though the degree of risk on the individual physician
might be very small).
136. See infta notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
138. S e.g., Robert A. Berenson, A Physican'sRflections, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REPORTS 13 Jan.Feb., 1989) (noting that utilization review relies on the physician's willingness to become adversarial, rather
than on the "merits" of the case, and that most physicians take responsibility for acting as an advocate very
seriously).
139. 239 Cal. Rptr. 8 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Wtcklne, the court dealt with the issue of whether
a payer could be liable for injury to a patient resulting from the payer's decision to deny financing for the
patient's medical care as requested by the patient's physician. See id at 811. Ms. Wickline's doctor had
requested an extension of eight days for her recovery from an operation on her leg. Seeid at 813. The
utilization reviewers for the Medi-Cal Program denied the request for eight additional days and granted
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v. Blue Cross of Southern California,'4° California courts indicated that, in the
appropriate circumstance, a payer's utilization review decision could
serve as the basis for a cause of action. 14' To the extent that risk sharing
could prevent salient disputes over medical necessity decisions, it tends
to reduce the exposure to liability for payers. Individualized risk sharing
potentially achieves this goal by introducing adverse financial
consequences to the physician's decision to refer the patient to specialists
or for in-patient hospital services. Pooled risk sharing potentially
renders the issue moot for the payers. It does not matter to the payer if
the payer has to pay for care if the payment ultimately comes out of the
physician's own pocket anyway.
It is apparent that there is a great deal of care provided which is not
medically necessary.'42 Therefore, there is a need to find a way to
control the unfettered discretion to consume health care services. For
some procedures, at least, standardized treatment protocols may be
useful.'43 The health care system may be in need of some centralized

a stay of only four days. See
id at 814. Ms. Wickline was discharged from the hospital at the end of four
days and returned to her home. See id at 815. She subsequently suffered complications which resulted in
her leg being amputated. Se id at 811. She sued the Medi-Cal program, alleging that its utilization review
decision had contributed to her injury. Seeid. The court dismissed the claim but did state that under the
appropriate circumstances, a utilization review decision could serve as the basis of liability. See id at 819-20.
140. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). In this case, the court revisited the issue of liability for
utilization review. See
id at 880-81. Wilson was diagnosed as suffering from clinical depression, a condition
for which his physician recommended inpatient psychiatric care. See
id. at 877. The utilization reviewer
determined that such care was not necessary and indicated that Wilson's insurance would not pay for such
care. See
id at 877-78, 882. Mr. Wilson was discharged and subsequently committed suicide. Seeid at 878.
The court determined that the patient's estate had a cause of action against the utilization reviewer. Seeid
at 878, 883, 884-85.
141. Seei at 883; seealso Wi k/ine, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
Third party payers of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically
inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for
medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.
IdS
142. SeeWasted Health CareDollars, CONSUMER REP., July 1992, at 435, 436-37.
Many researchers have now attempted to qualify the rate at which specific procedures are
used unnecessarily. Twenty percent represents a rough average of the rates found in major
studies, and is a figure that several leading researchers in this field told us was a good
approximation for the rate of unnecessary care.
Twenty percent also seems to be a conservative estimate of the rate of unnecessary
hospital days, even though changes in Medicare and private-insurance policies make it
difficult to estimate that number precisely.
143. See Hall, Institutional Control, supra note 12, at 478-79.

Treatment protocols . . . serve some useful purpose simply as a checklist that forces
physicians to think more carefully about their treatment decisions. By setting a baseline to
which physicians must refer in formulating their treatment plan, protocols may help revise
and formalize the informal heuristics that are central to physicians' judgmental thought
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authority that will gather such information and determine the manner
in which the information is used.' 44 However, this process should be
salient, explicit, and subject to accountability. Utilization review,
despite any of its perceived shortcomings, is a more honest, open, and
accountable means to achieve this goal. Despite the complaints about
utilization review, it has one overriding benefit-the process is
notoriously open. The process openly pits the physician and the patient
against the utilization review organization. There is nothing secretive
about the process.' 45
Cost containment that is achieved by risk sharing is the exact opposite
of utilization review. Instead of being open and notorious, it is secretive
and subterranean. The disputes over care are not salient, they are
internal and fought out within the conscience of the individual physician
at the point of delivery. They may even be subconscious, operating
under the surface of the provider's attempt to exercise professional
judgment. There is no adversarial fleshing out of the decision.
VI. CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE AS A RESPONSE TO
RISK SHARING

Policy makers and commentators condone risk sharing as an effective
strategy in a program to contain health care costs." However, risk
sharing evokes the same concerns that prompted courts and legislatures
to adopt the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine. Risk
sharing has the potential for corrupting medical judgment to the
detriment of quality of health care. In fact, risk sharing may be more
vulnerable to charges of conflict of interest than the typical
arrangements that were the concern of the corporate practice doctrine.
Whether a physician was on a salary or not, or shared revenues with a
lay person probably did not create as much of a temptation as arrangements whereby percentages of the physician's income are withheld
toward the attainment of profit and loss goals.

processes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
144. The need for a centralized data gathering entity is supported by the concept of "small area
variation." Wasted Heal/h Care Dollars, CONSUMER REP., supra note 142, at 441. This concept was
developed byJohn Wennberg of Dartmouth University to describe the phenomenon of variation between
communities with respect to physicians' medical decisions. See id Because physicians practice in local
areas, they tend to take their cues from the physicians practicing around them. See id.This leads to
variations from community to community. See id.
145. SeeBerenson, supra note 138, at 13.
146. See, e.g.,Hall, Institutional Control, supra note 101, at 507-08.
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Risk sharing blurs the distinctions between inherently antagonistic
health care functions. It places physicians in the business of
insurance.'47 Insurance involves accepting the risk of liability for
expenses in exchange for a payment of premiums.'
Capitation
payments are insurance premiums that physicians accept in exchange
for their agreement to accept the expenses associated with their patients'
needs for medical services.' 49 The fact that the risk is internal is of little
comfort. If physicians find that the demand for their time is beyond
what the capitation payments allow them to provide, what happens?
Along the same lines, fee withholding represents a physician's agreement
to place certain assets at risk for medical expenditures. 5 ' This is the
same as an insurance company setting aside reserves to meet
expenditures. One commentator has noted:
Risk-sharing capitation relationships implicate the same concerns as
traditional insurance relationships.
Like traditional insurers,
providers can minimize their costs by denying legitimate claims.
However, unlike traditional insurers, providers are capable of
controlling whether many of the claims are generated; by denying
51
access to care for which the provider is at risk, the cost is avoided.'
The difference is that activities by insurance companies are heavily
regulated,'52 while physician insurance activities are not. Another
difference is that insurance companies have access to the actuarial data
necessary to set capitation rates and establish risk-pool budgets. 153 This
allows them to attempt to manipulate their exposure to loss. Physicians

147. See Sanders, supra note 118, at 109.
148. See id.
149. Seeid. at 110.
150. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 23, at 1744 (discussing typical withhold arrangement).
151. Sanders, supra note 118, at 112.
152. FURROW ETAL.,supra note 2, at 207.
Private health insurance is extensively regulated in the United States. Traditionally,
insurance regulation has been the business of the states....
State regulations attempt to assure the solvency of health insurance by prescribing
capital and financial reserve requirements. They attempt to protect consumers by requiring
disclosure of contract information, standardized printing of terms of coverage, insurance
company bonding and auditing. Some states review and approve the rates charged by some
insurers to some insureds (e.g. Blue Cross individual policy rates) ....
State laws often
require private insurers to provide certain benefits, to pay for the services of certain
providers, or to make coverage available to certain persons. State regulations also address
coordination of benefits in situations where more than one family member is covered by
more than one insurer.
153. S* e.g., Michael Kraten & R. Michael Yesh, Health Care Organications-Th Business Imp ications
of CapitaionRevenue Methodologis, 14 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 15, 15 (1995) (noting the need for analysis of
historical costs by demographic group in order to set capitation rates).
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do not typically have access to such data and must rely on the good faith
of the insurance companies to set capitation rates and risk-pool budgets
that reflect the insurance company's estimate of what care should be
needed."M Without the protection of the corporate practice doctrine,
physicians share risk-engage in the business of insurance-as unequal
partners with insurance companies.
The insurance industry is also covered by laws that protect the patient
in the event of the insurer's insolvency. Insurance guaranty associations
provided for under state laws require the association to fulfill an
insolvent insurance company's obligations under its policies.'55
Although HMOs are generally not included in the guaranty
associations, there are also state laws that prohibit physicians from
pursuing patients for claims in the event of an HMO's insolvency.'56
The public does not have protection against physician insolvency which
may result from its risk-sharing ventures. These concerns have
influenced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to take
a closer look at the phenomenon of risk assumption by providers.'57 The
disturbing trend is that state regulations appear to condone risk sharing
as long as there is an insurance company or HMO in the
arrangement.' 5 8

154. See id ("Uncertainties regarding actual costs . . often lead health care organizations to accept
insufficient capitation rates and incur significant financial risk."); see also Allison Overbay & Mark Hall,
Insurance Regulation of Providers That Bear Risk, 22 AM.J.L. & MED. 361, 368 (1996) (noting that lack of
actuarial expertise by provider groups may cause them to set capitation rates too low).
155. See Mark A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection andManaged Care: Issues, Reform Proposalsand Trade Offs,
32 HOUS. L REV. 1319, 1373 n.262 (1996) (referring to guaranty association statutes in Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota). These statutes provide for "guaranty
associations" that fulfill the obligations of insolvent commercial insurers. See id at 1373. In some
jurisdictions, HMOs are also covered by guaranty associations. Karen 0. Bowdre, GuarantyAssociation Law
in Alabama, 20 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 321, 357 (1989-90) (noting establishment of HMO guaranty
allocations in Alabama, Florida, and Illinois and inclusion of HMOs in life and health insurance guaranty
associations in Utah and Wisconsin); see also National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
White Paper on Risk Bearing Entities (Dec. 1996), rprined in 6 BNA HEALTH L REP. 73, 95 (Jan. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter NAIC White Paper] (noting that most states do not include HMOs and other managed care
entities in guaranty association framework).
156. SeeJay M. Howard, TheAf enna ofHMO Insokcvuy: ConsiderationsforProviders,4 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 87, 95 (1995) (noting requirement of NAIC Model HMO Act which provides that a "hold harmless"
clause must be included in contract between HMO and contracting physician). Hold harmless clauses
require physicians to contractually agree not to bill the patient in the event of the HMO's inability to pay.
See id at 96-97. The Model Act and variations thereon, have been adopted in over half of the states. See
NAIC White Paper, supra note 155, at 82. The Federal HMO Act also requires that enrollees not become
responsible for debts owed by the HMO. See Howard, supra at 93.
157. Se NAIC White Paper, supra note 155, at 74. (noting that an underlying assumption isthat all
entities that assume health insurance risk should be subject to solvency and other appropriate consumer
protection standards).
158. Sa id. at85 ("The vast majority of states do not require a downstream contractor to obtain an
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The message appears to be that the only way to curb health costs is
if everyone shares in the financial risk. The private health insurance
industry has engaged in financial risk shifting not only with physicians,
but also with employers, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and
patients. All of this risk sharing has proceeded with the acquiescence,
and sometimes leadership, of the federal government.
Employers have accepted first dollar financial risk for health services
by moving to self-insured plans'59 under the umbrella of the Employees
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).60 ERISA
affords employers certain advantages such as preemption of state law
causes of action and remedies. 6 ' ERISA also allows employers to avoid
mandatory state health insurance requirements.' 62 Through selfinsurance, the insurance companies impose upon employers the
obligation to engage in rationing health care.'63 Insurance companies
have also required hospitals to accept per diem payments--another
form of insurance premium.'64 Further, insurance companies have
required patients to assume larger portions of the first dollar care by
imposing higher deductibles and co-insurance requirements.165 Insurers
are also beginning to enter into risk-sharing arrangements with

insurance license to accept insurance risk."). "Downstream" risk arrangements are contractual agreements
through which physicians assume part of the insurance company's or HMO's risk. Id. Such downstream
risk involves the mechanisms described in this Article: capitation and fee withholding. Seeidat 79-80.
Such arrangements admittedly involve the provider in the business of insurance; however, regulators have
seealso
been inconsistent in their application of insurance requirements on such arrangements. Se id.;
Overbay & Hall, supra note 154, at 372 (noting that most states have opted to characterize downstream risk
assumption as subcontracting, rather than the business of insurance, under the rationale that the main
entity responsible for providing health care-the HMO-is already subject to strict regulation).
159. See
Thomas Bodenheimer, The Reconfiguration ofUS. Medine, 274JAMA 85, 87 (1995) (noting
that, in 1991, 40% of employees receiving employee-sponsored health benefits were in self-insured plans).
160. Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
and 29 U.S.C.).
161. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (turning aside claim under Mississippi
state law alleging bad faith denial of claim).
162. See Metropolitan life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that state could
impose mandated mental health coverage on insurers but could not require the same for self-funded
employers).
163. See, eg., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) and Owens v. Storehouse,
984 F.2d 394 (11 th Cir. 1993). In each of these cases, employers chose to limit coverage for employees
suffering from AIDS in light of the threat to the fiscal integrity of their employee health benefit programs.
The choices faced by such employers has been characterized as a "fundamental dilemma.., one person's
need for a huge amount of insurance coverage versus other group member's continued need for routine
coverage." Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurane Risk CLasification,After McGann: MaagingRisk Effivo in the
Shadow ofdw ADA, 47 BAYLORL REV. 59, 80 (1995). Self-insurance offers employers a flexible alternative
to offering no health benefits at all. See id. at 77.
164. See Randall, supra note 4, at 31.
165. See idat 17.
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pharmaceutical companies. 166 Under the current regime, it appears that
everyone is required to shoulder some financial risk for health care
services.
Viewed in this context, risk sharing between insurers and physicians
is just another example of the larger phenomenon. There is one
fundamental difference, however. The other players are not decision
makers operating in a fiduciary capacity. Hospitals do not decide
whether to admit a patient-physicians do. Hospitals do not decide on
the course of a patient's treatment-physicians do. Employers do not
decide whether a patient needs a particular treatment--employers
merely decide whether the employer sponsored health benefit package
will cover the treatment. Employers do not establish treatment plans for
patients.
Therefore, although risk sharing by physicians is consistent with the
current environment in which it is assumed that everyone must assume
some of the risk of health care expenditures in order to contain cost,
there is something inherently problematic in physician risk sharing. By
co-opting physicians to the insurance function, we remove an important
actor in the p reservation of the quality of health care-the advocate for
treatment.'67
If mechanisms were in place that prevented the payers from shifting
the cost of doing business to the providers, several things might occur:
(1) health insurance premiums would rise to a higher level thereby
threatening additional consumers with the prospect of becoming
uninsured, (2) there would be fewer insurance providers and perhaps
more consolidation in health care financing, and (3) an honest effort to
contain costs might occur. Each of these would be a benefit. To the
extent that higher premiums threaten more individuals with loss of
insurance coverage, this might increase political pressure for some type
of universal health coverage.'68 To the extent that numbers of payers
were forced out of the market, this would allow the remaining insurers

166. See, e.g., Alicia A. Barnett, Strategiesfor the Future

hamtaceuticalCompanies Emphasiing Disease

Managment, Risk Sharing, 13 BUS. & HEALTH 46 (1995) ("[U]nder such arrangements the pharmaceudcal
company shares the risk for a successful outcome. In one such arrangement, the drug company refunds
money to the insurer if the patient's symptoms worsen after use of a drug sold to the insurer.").
167. See Sanders, supra note 118, at 112 ("The physician acts as a check on the traditional insurer
because he will at least alert the patient to the fact that care is indicated."); Randall, supra note 4, at 34
("Historically, we have seen how the profit motive worked to increase utilization. There is no reason to

think that similar dysfunctions will not occur in a system designed to enhance profits by decreasing
utilization." (footnote omitted)).

168. See Mollyann Brodie & RobertJ. Blendon, The Public'sContibuin to CongrasionalGkidlock on Health
CareReform, 20J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L 403,403-04 (1995) (noting that growing number of uninsured,
among other things, contributed to middle class concerns about health care and that such concern was a
factor in the health care reform debate).

1998]

CORPORATE PRACTICE OFMEDICINE

519

to take advantage of the law of large numbers and risk pooling, which
is the fundamental principle upon which insurance operates.'69 To the
extent that a more honest approach is taken to contain costs, we would
be forced into undertaking the data collection necessary to provide a
good set of clinical practice protocols.'70
In this context, the old dogma-the prohibition on the corporate
practice of medicine-assumes a new purpose. It would maintain a
separation of function. Insurers should insure, physicians should treat
patients, and conflicts between the two should not be subverted. The
corporate practice doctrine would prevent insurers from exporting part
of their costs to physicians. Exportation of their costs allows the industry
to operate as if it can offer a viable product in a profitable business.
Health coverage is a viable product only if it is subsidized. Resurrection
of the corporate practice doctrine would prevent exportation of the costs
of doing business in the health financing field. This would reveal that
provision health care coverage through the private market is inefficient.
Another useful purpose for a reassertion of the corporate practice
doctrine would be to repair the damage to the fiduciary relationship
between the patient and the physician. One original purpose of the
doctrine was to prevent the commercialization of the medical
profession.'
Preventing commercialization would engender public
trust in the profession.' 72 Under utilization review, the physician can
still function as a fiduciary.' 73 However, to the extent that risk sharing
becomes more prevalent and knowledge about its prevalence in health
care financing spreads to the public, the public becomes less trustful of
physicians' financial motives. '7' Although the empirical evidence does

169. See Mark A. Hall, The Role ofInsurance PurchasingCooperatsw in Health Care Reform, 3 KAN.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 95, 98 (1993-94) ("According to the statistical Law of Large Numbers, the ability to predict
accurately the actual loss a group will suffer decreases as the group becomes smaller, therefore, small risk
pools require a larger risk premium per equivalent expected loss than do larger groups.").
170. See The Health Care Study Group, Report. Understandingthe Choices in Health Care Reform, 19J.
HEALTH POL POL'Y & L 499, 527 (1994) ("Treatment protocols are standard procedures for diagnosing
disease, given certain symptoms, or treating disease, given a diagnosis.... They require detailed and
expensive studies involving large numbers of patients and controls.").
171. See Alanson W. Willcox, Hospitalsand the CorporatePractice ofMedicine, 45 CORNEL L Q.432, 446
(1960).
172. Se, e.g., Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942) ("[A]n ethical, trusAtordy
and unselfish professionalism as the community needs and wants cannot survive in a purely commercial
atmosphere." (emphasis added)).
173. See Sanders, supra note 118, at 112 (noting that under traditional insurance, a physician acts as
a check on the traditional insurer because the physician will alert the patient to the need for care).
174. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1694 ("[T'he limited evidence available suggests
that many [patients] are uncomfortable with incentives that require physicians to balance the benefits of
their medical care against the costs that it engenders for the plan. Thus, payment arrangements could

significantly undermine patients' beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents.").
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not indicate that risk sharing has caused a deterioration in the quality of
patient care, 175 stories abound in the popular media based on the
assumption that physicians' decision making is impaired because of
negative financial inducements. 176 The idea that people cannot trust
their physicians yields a rather different system for delivering health care
than a system based on an assumption of trust. It should be noted that
the "quality" of health care has a psychic, as well as concrete, dimension
and that this quality can be diminished if the patient does not trust the
physician.17

There are some advocates for altering the patient-physician
relationship. They believe that the cost spiral in medicine was the result79
78
of the paternalistic1 relationship between patients and physicians.

The physician talked, the patient listened without question. The
physician prescribed medication which the patient ingested without
question. The patient endured surgical procedures without a thought
about obtaining a second opinion. The problems with the costs of
health care resulted from the unwavering trust that the patient placed
in the physician's decision making. According to these advocates, it
would not be a such a bad thing to have patients assume a mo-re "arm's
length" relationship with physicians and become180more questioning,
more informed consumers of health care services.

175. Se supra note 129.
176. See supra note 128.
177. See Capron, supra note 125, at 737-38 ("It has even been found that many patients experience
therapeutic benefits resulting from trust in their physician and her judgment." (citing E. FREIEDSON,
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 263-68 (1970))); see
also RODWIN, supra note 26, at 153 (noting that incentives give patients reason to doubt their physician's
neutrality and thereby weaken the informed consent process).
178. See Hall, supranote 2 1, at 728 ("[T]he central value of professionally dominated medical ethics
is patient well-being, traditionally defined in a highly paternalistic and authoritarian fashion.").
179.
e.g., Hall, supra note 21, at 729-3 1. Professor Hall describes a school of medical ethics
described as the "beneficence" school. Underlying this school was the thought that the physician would
direct the patient in the selection oftreatment options. For this school, the patient's trust in the physician
was required. This required the physician to be above concerns about the costs of treatment. Hall indicates
that such a model "fits only the comprehensive, unregulated, fee-for-service type of insurance that
dominated prior to 1980. It is precisely this form of insurance, however, that is driving up the costs of
treatment to the extent that insurance is unaffordable for tens of millions." Jl at 731; see also John A.
Siliciano, Wea/k Equity and the Unitay MedicalMalpractice Standard,77 VA. L REV. 439, 449 (1991) ("The
physician-patient relationship.., was paternalistic and fiduciary in nature, and thus encouraged health care
cbnsumers to acquiesce in the decisions of their physicians.").
180. See MaxwellJ. Mehlman, MedicalAdvocates: A CallFor a New Profession, I WIDENER L. SYMP.J.
299, 310. In this article, Mehlman describes a "consumerism" approach (with which he disagrees).
According to Mehlman, under this consumerism approach:
[T]he emphasis is on self-reliance. Patients are repeatedly being urged to protect their
interests themselves. "Choose your physician or health plan wisely," they are told.
According to this consumerism approach, patients should arm themselves with information,
often obtaining it from the health plans or providers themselves, and make informed, self-
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However, to the extent that such an arm's length relationship would
be better, this does not mean that this relationship should be fostered by
the introduction of subtle negative financial considerations into the
physician-patient relationship. Utilization review, despite its perceived
shortcomings, provides the opportunity for an arm's length relationship
by subjecting a physician's decision to an external second opinion.
Ideally, this second opinion will be informed by the best available
current treatment protocols. This would be a much better approach to
correcting the perceived abuses arising from a paternalistic physicianpatient relationship than a subterranean process that relies on patients'
unhealthy suspicions about their physicians' financial motives. Indeed,
such suspicion diminishes the quality of care. Reassertion of the
corporate practice doctrine could reestablish the trust by removing the
appearance of impropriety.
VII. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO RISK-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
The current federal approach to health care cost recognizes the
connection between financial benefit to physicians and their decision
making. Federal policy recognizes that financial inducements can yield
overutilization of health care resources. Thus, federal policy has
implemented rules to disrupt this causal relationship in the form of
outright prohibitions on certain types of financial arrangements that
have the potential to cause overutilization of health care resources. On
the other hand, the federal government has been slow to recognize that
negative financial inducements inherent in capitation and fee
withholding have the potential to cause underutilization of services. In
effect, the federal response is asymmetrical. It prohibits financial
relationships that induce overutilization on one hand, but tolerates
financial relationships that could cause underutilization, on the other.
Under the corporate practice doctrine, a court did not have to
determine that the conflict of interest actually resulted in a negative
consequence for the patient or that because of the conflict of interest the
physician ever actually acted in a manner that was not in the patient's
best interest. 8 ' According to the doctrine, the risk of abuse was so great

interested choices.
Id.; seealso E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quaip by Reasging Responsibility, 20 AM.J. L & MED. 79, 102
(1994) (describing benefits of a system in which patients motivated by economic consequences of care
decisions interact with physicians on a more informed basis).
181. See,
e.g.,Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942) ("Though the exhibited
instance of that conduct [referring to a corporate practice arrangement] has accomplished no evil, if its
inherent tendency be at war with public interest, it is contrary to public policy.").
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as to justify barring the arrangement that would create the potential for
abuse.' 82 In other words, the best protection was removing temptation
altogether.
The federal government uses the same approach of removing
temptation when addressing financial transactions that have the
potential for causing overutilization of services. Studies have indicated
that Medicare beneficiaries treated by physicians who owned or invested
in independent clinical laboratories received forty-five percent more
laboratory services from the independent clinical laboratories than
Medicare beneficiaries in general.'83 These results supported the
premise that, if it is to a physician's economic advantage, the physician
will overutilize services. Therefore, federal law imposes preventative
measures by prohibiting relationships that create the potential for
excessive utilization.
Hence, federal legislation broadly proscribes transactions and
relationships that have the potential to lead to overutilization of medical
services. Under Stark II,18 a physician is prohibited from making

182. Seeid.
183. Isms Relatedto Physician "&f-Referrals.'" Hearngson H.R. 939 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight ofJAe
Com. on Ways andMeans, 101st Cong. (1989) (testimony of Michael Zimmerman, Director, Medicare and
Medicaid Issues, Human Resources Division of the U.S. Government Accounting Office).
184. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1995)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L No. 103-6,
107 Stat. 596 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994)). Section 1395nn provides, in pertinent
part:
Limitation on certain physician referrals
(a) Prohibition of certain referrals
(1) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, if a physician (or an
immediate family member of such physician) has a financial relationship
with an entity specified in paragraph (2), then (A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing
of designated health services for which payment otherwise may be
made under this subchaptcr, and
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under
this subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payor, or other
entity for designated health services furnished pursuant to a referral
prohibited under subparagraph (A).
(2) Financial relationship specified
For purposes of this section, a financial relationship of a physician (or an
immediate family member of such physician) with an entity specified in
this paragraph is(A) except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an
ownership or investment interest in the entity, or
(B) except as provided in subsection (e)of this section, a compensation
arrangement (as defined in subsection (h)(1) of this section) between
the physician (or an immediate family member of such physician)
and the entity.
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referrals for the furnishing of designated health services for which
payment may be made under the Medicare or Medicaid program to any
entity with which the physician has a financial relationship.' 85 Under
the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse statute,186 it is illegal to
solicit or receive any remuneration in return for referring a patient for
services.'87 Although there are exceptions to each of these laws, the
exceptions recognize that any compensation or benefit flowing to the
physician in excess of the fair market value for services rendered by the
physician presents a potential for overutilization.'88 Therefore, the
Id.
185.. ee id.
186. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175
(1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
187. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified as amended
42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b (1988)). The anti-kickback statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind (A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under [Medicare or Medicaid], or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
[Medicare or Medicaid],
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000
or imprisoned for not more than five years or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or
in kind to any person to induce such person (A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under [Medicare or Medicaid], or
(B) to purchase, lease, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State
health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony...
42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
188. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1996). This "safe harbor" provides that the anti-kickback law is not
violated if, among other things:
The aggregate rental charge is set in advance, isconsistent with fair market value in armslength transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume
or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or [Medicaid] ....
Id
[T ]he termfair mar/e value means the value of the rental property for general commercial
purposes, but shall not be adjusted to reflect the additional value that one party (either the
prospective lessee or lessor) would attribute to the property as a result of its proximity or
convenience to sources of referrals or business otherwise generated for which payment may
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exceptions are narrowly drawn to eliminate any excess compensation.
For example, a physician may lease office space from a hospital to which
the physician admits patients and not violate the anti-referral laws if the
physician leases the space at its fair rental value. However, if the
hospital subsidizes the physician's rent by offering the physician belowmarket lease rates, the law would be violated.'89
The federal government has clearly acknowledged that there may be
a connection between financial inducements and overutilization of
health care services. It has addressed this situation by prohibiting
financial arrangements that have the potential to cause physicians to
overutilize health care resources. If it is true that financial inducements
can increase utilization, is it also not true that financial incentives can
cause physicians to underutilize services?
The federal government has not approached the potential problems
with negative financial inducements with the fervor that it has used to
address positive financial inducements. 9 ' The federal government
acknowledges that there is a potential for negative inducements to cause
physicians to underutilize health care resources."' g However, instead of
broadly prohibiting such inducements, the federal government draws a
line between permissible and impermissible negative financial
inducements in an attempt to preserve risk sharing. Thus, in 1986,
Congress amended the Medicare statute to prohibit hospitals and
HMOs from making direct or indirect payments to physicians for the
purpose of inducing physicians to reduce services to Medicare
beneficiaries. 92 Risk-sharing mechanisms have the purpose of reducing
physicians' utilization of health care resources. Therefore, this
prohibition would probably invalidate these risk-sharing mechanisms.
Outlawing risk-sharing mechanisms, however, would amount to an
abandonment of twenty years of policy making pursuant to which the

be made in whole or in part under Medicare or [Medicaid] ....
Id.
189. Md
190. See id. (noting that the breadth of the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute has

caused considerable concern among health care providers that "many relatively innocuous, or even
beneficial commercial arrangements are technically covered by the statute and are, therefore, subject to
criminal prosecution.").
191. Sw Haney & Bayles, supra note 2 (citing United States General Accounting Office report which
concluded that "[i]ncentive plans may offer such strong financial incentives to physicians to reduce

utilization that quality of care could be adversely affected through the withholding of needed services").
192. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 913 (c)(1)(E), 100 Stat.
1874, 2003 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a). Previously, the statute only applied to
hospitals. Subsequently, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) again to delete references to
HMOs. SeeOmnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4731(b)(1), 104 Stat.

1388, 1388-95. •
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federal government has condoned financial risk-sharing arrangements.
In the Federal HMO Act of 1973, the federal government
acknowledged the role that risk sharing might play in the development
of HMOs. The Federal HMO Act requires HMOs to assume full
financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health
services; however, the Act specifically authorizes provider risk sharing
as a means to meet this responsibility.'93 In addition, the federal
government itself introduced a type of risk sharing for Medicare through
its introduction of the diagnosis related grouping (DRG) compensation
methodology in 1983.1' DRG compensation altered the traditional feefor-service methodology that had been used to compensate hospitals.
Under DRG, the hospital would be entitled to a predetermined amount
for each patient encounter dependent upon the patient's admission
diagnosis. This represented a type of risk sharing because the hospital
would only get a set fee regardless of how long it took to treat the
patient. The risk assumed by the hospital was that it might lose money
on the patient.
Risk sharing has permeated federal thinking about health care cost
containment. For example, the response to physicians' desire to
combine forces to combat the market power exercised by payers was to
create an antitrust safe harbor for physicians who, among other things,
share substantial financial risk.'95 In other words, if physicians desire to
193. Se 42 U.S.C. § 300c(c)(2)(D) (1994). HMOs may make "arrangements with physicians or other
health professionals, health care institutions... to assume all or part of the financial risk on a prospective
basis for the provision of basic health services ....
Id. Furthermore, federally qualified HMOs dealing
with the Medicare program must have "effective procedures to monitor utilization and to control cost of
basic and supplemental health services and to achieve utilization goals, which may include mechanisms
such as risk sharing, financial incentives, or other provisions agreed to by providers." 42 C.F.R.
417.103(b)B (1996).
194. See Thomas Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 976.
[U]nder DRGs Medicare pays the hospital a lump sum for each hospital admission, with
the size of the payment dependent on the patient's diagnosis .... DRG reimbursement
lumps together all services performed during one hospital episode ....
Under the DRG system ... the hospital is at risk for the length of hospital stay and for
the resources used during the hospital stay.
Id.
195. See Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Enforcement Policy
and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, reprintedin 3 BNA Health L Rep. 1376,
1391 (Sept. 27, 1994). Statement No. 8 of the Department ofJustice and FTC statements relates to
physician network joint ventures. See id. The Statement notes that physician-controlled networks, which
would otherwise be subject to antitrust enforcement for collectively agreeing on prices or other significant
terms of competition, will not be challenged, if, among other things, the physicians in the group "share
substantial financial risk." Id. at 1392. Sharing substantial financial risk may be:
(1) when the venture agrees to provide services to a health benefits plan at a "capitated"
rate; or

(2)

when the venture creates significant financial incentives for its members as a group to
achieve specified cost-containment goals, such as withholding from all members a
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jointly act against a payer, they need to share financial risks. The FTC
and the Department of Justice indicate that physicians may share
substantial financial risk by accepting a capitation agreement or by
having their fees subject to a substantial withhold with the return
dependent upon the entity meeting its cost saving goals.' 96
Given this history of support for risk sharing, the federal government
needed to find a means to preserve risk sharing despite its acknowledged
potential problems. Therefore, at the same time that Congress included
HMOs in the prohibition, Congress delayed implementation of
penalties against HMOs and instructed the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop some guidelines for
risk sharing that would not violate the statute.' 97 Subsequently,
Congress repealed application of the strict prohibition as it applies to
HMOs and instead adopted a more lenient standard for HMOs.'98
Under the applicable standard, an HMO is prohibited from operating
a plan under which a "specific payment is made directly or indirectly...
to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit
medically necessary services provided with respect to a specific
individual enrolled with the organization."1' 99 The statute does not
prohibit risk-sharing arrangements: "If the plan places a physician or
group at substantial financial risk (as determined by the Secretary) for

substantial amount of the compensation due to them, with distribution of that amount
to the members only if the cost-containment goals are met.
Id. (footnote omitted).
196. See id.
197. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-509, § 9313(c)(1)(E), 100
Stat. 1874, 2003-04.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report to Congress, not later than
January 1, 1988, concerning incentive arrangements offered by health maintenance
organizations and competitive medical plans to physicians. The report shall:
(A) review the type of incentive arrangements in common use,
(B) evaluate their potential to pressure improperly physicians to reduce or limit services
in a medically inappropriate manner, and
(C) make recommendations concerning providing for an exception, to the prohibition
contained in section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act [the U.S.C. 1320a-7a(b)
prohibition of payments to induce care reductions, for incentive arrangement to
induce care reductions], for incentive arrangements that may be used by such
organizations and plans to encourage efficiency in the utilization of medical and other
services but that do not have a substantial potential for adverse effect on quality.
Id A series of amendments eventually delayed implementation of the HMO-related penalties until April
1, 1991. See id. § 9313(c)(E), 100 Stat. at 2003 (setting implementation date as April 1, 1989); OBRA of
1987, Pub. L No. 100-203, § 4016, 101 Stat. 1330-64, 1330.64 (amending implementation of Pub. L. No.
100-203 to April 1, 1990); OBRA of 1988, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6207(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2245
(amending implementation of Pub. L No. 100-203 to April 1, 1991).
198. OBRA of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-508, §4731, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-195.
199. Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii)()).
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services not provided by the physician or physician group," the
organization must provide "stop-loss protection. 200
In other words, the Secretary of HHS is charged with drawing a line
between permissible and impermissible negative inducements. The
Secretary must answer the question of what amount of financial risk will
not cause the physician to underutilize health care resources. This is a
rather misguided exercise. The appropriate guideline would be an
amount of financial risk that would prevent a physician from rendering
medically unnecessary services, but that would not cause the physician
to withhold medically necessary services. This would appear to require
pinpoint accuracy which, in turn, would require access to a numerical
cause and effect relationship that is not only unknown, but perhaps
unknowable.
In order to define substantial financial risk, HHS examined the
201
various risk-sharing compensation systems in effect in the market.
HHS noted that the key feature involved in financial risk systems was a
differential between the potential high and low compensation that
physicians could receive under any particular system. Under these
systems, depending on the physician's attainment of the HMO cost200. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (i)(8)(A)(ii)(I). "Stop loss" is a device for limiting the physicians' losses to
a designated dollar amount. See Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care
Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59024, 59026 (1992).
Many physicians incentive plans incorporate stop-loss protection to limit the liability of the
physician or physician group. Most often, the stop-loss protection limits a physician's
maximum liability per patient to a specific dollar amount .... In some cases, prepaid health
care organizations place an aggregate limit on the liability the physician could face....
Stop-loss protection is particularly common with capitation arrangements.
IM; sac also DAVID W. LEE, CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE 20 (1995) ("Reinsurance or stop-loss:
An insurance plan in which the insurer agrees to share or assume treatment costs that exceed a predefined
threshold amount."). Under the statute, a managed care organization would be responsible for providing
such stop loss by either committing to cover the excess liability itself or purchasing a reinsurance policy,
or reimbursing the physician for the expenses associated with a reinsurance policy. Requirements for
Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 59032.
The organization can either provide or buy the stop-loss protection, or the physician or
physician group can obtain the protection.
• . . Since the legislation requires the organization to provide the stop-loss, we [the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)] are requiring the organization to pay
the cost of the portion of stop-loss protection that covers its enrollees in the physician
incentive plan, or increase the amount ofstop-loss protection to account for the physician's
cost for stop loss.
Id; Thus, by defining "substantial financial risk," the Secretary of HHS would place a limit on the degree
of risk shifting that an entity could engage in with a physician or group of physicians. The entity which
places physicians at a substantial risk was also obligated to conduct periodic surveys of its membership in
order to "determine the degree of access of such individuals to services provided by the organization and
satisfaction with the quality of services." 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)Cii)(II).
201. See Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 59,025-26, 59,028.
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containment goals, the physician's net income could vary. For example,
if the system provided for a twenty percent fee withhold to pay for the
services of specialists and for in-patient hospital services, the physician
could get back all or none of the withheld fees depending on the cost
performance-this represented a twenty percent differential between the
low and high compensation that the physician could receive. HHS
defined substantial financial risk for organizations that assess or
distribute incentive payments more than once a year as twenty-five
percent, and for organizations that assess or distribute incentive
payments more than once a year as fifteen percent." 2
The effect of the proposed rule would be to set a limit on the degree
of risk sharing that HMOs could impose on physicians. In the event
that the HMO assessed the incentive arrangement not more than once
a year, the HMO could not implement a plan that exposed more than
twenty-five percent of the physician's income to risk for services not
provided by the physician. The HMOs would need to provide stop-loss
coverage for the physicians to prevent their losses.
In order to determine that twenty-five percent was the appropriate
risk threshold, HHS observed that, in the market it surveyed, withholds
of twenty-five and thirty percent represented the upper ranges used
under typical circumstances. 03 In addition, HHS relied on the fact that
Group Health Associations of America identified the median withhold
percentage as twenty percent.2 The agency justified its selection of the
twenty percent threshold because:
(1) It represented an industry standard which appeared to be
acceptable to physicians;
(2) Physicians were typically known to shoulder a risk of bad debt
exposure of up to 20% of their fees;
(3) Physicians were known to customarily discount their fees by
20%.205

Therefore, the agency reasoned:

202. Id. at 59,027. HHS established two risk thresholds because:
T] he shorter the timeframe over which incentive arrangements assess a physician's or a
physician group's performance, the more influence the incentive arrangement will have.
This isbecause physicians or physician groups have fewer patients in a short timeframe over
which to spread the risk of expensive treatment than in a long timeframe. Since these types
of arrangements have the potential to have a stronger influence on physician behavior, we
believe that the lower risk threshold [15%] is appropriate.
Id. at 59,030.
203. See id at 59,028.
204. See i This was based on a Group Health Association survey conducted in 1987. Seeid.
205. Id at 59,028, 59,03 1.
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[F]inancial incentive plans that place physicians or physician groups
at risk for 25 percent of their payments.., would appear to be of the
same magnitude as the reduction in payments many physicians
voluntarily accept in return for increased volume and protection
against bad debt, and in response to market place competition. 2°
This reasoning is flawed. If the goal of the regulations is to protect
against the potential negative consequences of risk shifting, the market
does not provide the best point of reference. By adopting the median
withhold that its survey revealed existed in the marketplace; in effect,
HHS defined substantial risk as risk in excess of what the average
physician has accepted in a marketplace in which the physician is at a
negotiating disadvantage." 7 In other words, substantial risk is excess of
what the market would bear. Basically, HHS proposed to adopt the
industry norm as the threshold figure and relied on the fact that
no
208
discernible problems with patient care had arisen in the market.
It is equally unreasonable to use a physician's acceptance of a twenty
percent bad-debt experience to establish an acceptable threshold for
determining substantial financial risk. Unlike risk-sharing mechanisms
that place the physician's income at risk, the fact that the physician's bad
debt is ten to twenty percent does not have the potential for inducing a
physician to reduce services. Bad debt expense is, to a degree,
something that is uncontrollable prior to rendering the service. It is
within the physician's power to ensure that withheld fees are returned.
Along similar lines, the fact that physicians discount their fees by as
much as twenty percent does not mean that a twenty percent fee
withhold or other risk-sharing mechanism will not necessarily cause
physicians to withhold medically necessary services. It has been
observed that physicians will make up for discounts by increased volume
of services. Also, the acceptance of a twenty percent discount has an air
of inevitability about it-it is the product of absence of negotiating
power that the physician accepts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Physicians may be able to control the loss of income resulting from risk
sharing by withholding medically necessary services. In addition, HHS
itself acknowledged the possibility that the withholds are typically not
applied against the usual and customary physician's fees, but against fees
that have already been discounted.20 9

206. Id. at 59,028.
207. See supra
notes 153-54 and accompanying text relating physicians' disadvantage when negotiating

risk-sharing arrangements.
208. See id.
("InThere is no evidence that conventional physician incentive plans... have reduced

access or caused quality of care problems.").
209. Id.at 59,031 ("[W]e are concerned that such discounts may be factored into the plan's payments
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The federal government's approach to risk sharing involves a shaky
acceptance of the practices in the marketplace. This is done to preserve
risk sharing, but also to curb its potential harm. In adopting this
approach, the federal government can take comfort in the fact that
empirical evidence seems to bear out the fact that the use of financial
incentives has not reduced the quality of care for patients.
Just as private sector payers, the government has an interest in risk
sharing as a means to lower its costs of providing health benefits. Risk
sharing allows implicit rationing. The federal government is no more
interested in explicit health care rationing than the private sector
payer.2 ° Therefore, the federal government is acting as a prudent payer
of health care services; thus, it makes sense for the government to
tolerate mechanisms used to shift some of the risk of providing health
coverage to third parties. This also explains the growth in Medicare,
Medicaid, and managed care plans under the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Service (CHAMPUS).21 ' This
strategy, however, allows managed care organizations that accept
Medicare risk contracts to export part of the cost of insuring
beneficiaries of federal programs onto providers of health care services.
In this manner, the federal government allows the private healih care
system to operate with the benefit of a hidden subsidy. If the federal
government would embrace the corporate practice of medicine doctrine,
it would curtail this hidden subsidy and would awaken the government,
as well as private industry, to the true costs of doing business in the
current fragmented system of health care financing.
VIII. SOLUTIONS TO THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH
RISK SHARING

As developed throughout this Article, reassertion of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine would curtail risk-sharing arrangements.
This would have the effect of requiring different actors in the health care
financing system to shoulder their own costs of doing business and not
receive hidden subsidies. This would be beneficial for a number of
reasons, including restoration of trust between physicians and patients,

to the physician or physician group. If so, the 25-percent risk would be applied to an already discounted
amount, which may not be reasonable.").
210. Se,e.g., David L Weigert, Tragic
Choites: State Disction Over Organ TransplantFundingForMedicaid
Recipients, 89 Nw. U. L Rev. 268, 296-97 (discussing the federal government's historical reluctance to ration
health care due to the "symbolic blackmail" involved when an identifiable life will be affected by the
explicit decision to deny payment for medically necessary but expensive services).
211. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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preventing implicit rationing of health care services, and forcing a more
honest debate about health care financing. However, policy makers and
commentators have proposed solutions to address risk sharing by
methods other than outright prohibition. The idea appears to be that
we can control the problem if we can tame it. We can tame it if we can
name it; therefore, some proposals are directed at having disclosures
made to patients about the risk-sharing relationships.212 Other
commentators believe that risk sharing does not pose a significant
problem because the tort system could punish financially motivated
decisions, and because physicians must act so as to avoid losing their
licenses.213
Disclosure of risk-sharing arrangements would be an ineffective
solution. Such a disclosure cheapens the physician-patient relationship,
thereby further undermining the patient's trust in the physician. This
tends to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the problems associated
with risk-sharing arrangements. This could lead to additional
questioning about physicians' decisions, which would introduce even
further inefficiency into the system. This disclosure also does not benefit
patients because there may be nothing that they could do with the
information that is relevant to curtailing the potential abuse. To the
extent that these forms of risk sharing are prevalent, the patient does not
have the option of seeking providers that are not covered by a risksharing arrangement.214
It has been argued that risk sharing does not cause physicians to
underutilize medical services because of the threat of liability or
professional sanctions." 5 Therefore, risk sharing does not provide any
real danger to the patients. The tort system will serve as an effective
deterrent to abuse of risk-sharing arrangements.

212. S* g., McGraw, supra note 7; Mary Anne Bobinski, upra note 25, at 387 ("Disclosure may be
a particularly important tool to protect consumers as our health system evolves.").
213. See Hall, supra note 21, at 766 (arguing against the inadequacy of disclosure requirements by
noting, among other things, the possibility of tort claims).
214. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1694.
[P]atients would be placed in a diffcult position of trying to interpret what they were told,
trying to understand the implications of different risk pools, and/or trying to assess the
consequences of financial risk. Even if they do understand, many patients face restricted
options because of lack of choice or few significant differences among the plans available to
them.
M; see also McGraw, supra note 7, at 1845 ("[A]t the moment the patient is deciding whether to adopt a
physician's treatment recommendation, the information about possible financial conflict of interest may
come too late. The patient is already enrolled in the insurance plan, and may not be able to seek care
elsewhere.").
215. See Hall, supra note 21, at 766.
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However, the courts have been loath to recognize the connection
between risk sharing and a patient's injuries. There are few reported
cases in which the connection between the compensation arrangement
and some perceived harm has been raised. Other than the case Bush v.
Dake,216 plaintiffs have uniformly been denied the ability to present the
connection to the jury. It is as if the courts have been afflicted by a
collective amnesia induced by twenty years of cost-containment oriented
policy making, which has made them forget the perils of lay interference
with physician decision making.
In Sweede v. CignaHealthplanofDelaware,Inc.,21 the plaintiff alleged that
the physician committed gross negligence by failing to timely refer her
to a surgeon when it was discovered that she had a lump in her breast.
The plaintiff alleged that the physician's delay in making the referral
was influenced by financial incentives in Cigna's compensation
arrangement with the physician. Her allegation was that Cigna's system
of capitation and fee withholding induced her physician to withhold her
care. The plaintiff claimed punitive damages because the defendant
recklessly delayed referring the plaintiff to a surgeon because of the
financial incentives. In the court's view, "[t]he number of referrals or
hospitalizations made by any one individual physician does not control
whether that physician will receive a return of his withholds."2 '
Therefore, the court ruled that any connection between Cigna's
capitation-withhold policy and the physician's decision regarding
referring the plaintiff to a surgeon was "too remote to be of significant
probative value."2" 9 According to the court, the facts, taken together,
did not support submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Teti v. US. Health Care involved a, claim under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against an HMO by
its enrollees.22 ° The basis of the enrollees' claim was that the HMO had
concealed from them the existence of risk-sharing arrangements with the
"'
HMO's physicians.22
The enrollees claimed that the concealment
constituted a pattern of fraudulent nondisclosure violative of RICO.
The court dismissed the RICO claim, reasoning that RICO requires an

216. Bush v. Dake is an unpublished opinion which is reprinted in FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at
384.
217. 1989 WL 12608 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
218. d at 5.
219. Id
220. Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., Nos. 88-9808,88-9822,1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14041, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 20, 1989).
221. &/wiat *2-3.
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enterprise operated for the furtherance of crime and that the plaintiff
had failed to raise a genuine fact issue on this point.222
In Pulvers v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan, Inc.,223 the plaintiffs alleged
that the Kaiser Permanente HMO committed fraud in the enrollment
process by holding itself out as "nonprofit" when its physicians were
covered by financial incentive arrangements. The plaintiffs alleged that
the physicians acted "for profit" in a nonprofit HMO.22 The court held
that the incentive plans are recommended by professional organizations
and required by the Federal HMO Act of 1973. According to the
HMO Act, HMOs must have effective procedures to monitor
utilization, to control cost of basic and supplemental health services, and
to achieve utilization goals, which may include mechanisms such as risk
sharing, financial
incentives, or other provisions agreed to by
225
providers.
Madsen v. Park NXcollet Medical Cente? 26 was a medical negligence case.
The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that a pregnant mother's
status as an HMO member meant that her hospitalization could have
adversely affected the physician's profit. The plaintiff wanted the jury
to consider whether this factor contributed to her physician's failure to
inform her about the need for hospitalization."' The court upheld the
lower court's decision to exclude this information noting that the
information "was only marginally relevant, and potentially very
prejudicial. 228
These cases indicate that the courts may be rather reluctant to
recognize any connection between physicians' financial incentives and
medical injuries. However, even if the courts could recognize such a
causal relationship, using the tort system to police quality would
misplace the burden. It would mean that the physicians would bear the
legal liability for activities that benefit the payers. This misplaced
burden is exacerbated by that fact that ERISA preempts state law causes
of action arising from the denial of benefits by managed care plans
providing health coverage pursuant to an employer-sponsored health
benefit plan.229

222. See id at 4.
223. 99 Cal. App. 3d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
224. Id. at 565.
225. Id.
226. 419 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1988).
The plaintiff in this case was the father. See id at 512. He alleged that the mother of his son had been
negligently treated during pregnancy. See id
227. See id. at 515.
228. Id
229. Se e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
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Furthermore, reliance on the tort system does not yield the
appropriate answer if the goal is to reduce medically unnecessary care.
Is the treatment decision that is the end result of the interplay between
negative financial inducements on the one hand, and the threat of
malpractice suits on the other hand, the right decision, or only the
expedient decision? This seems like a rather ingenuous and circuitous
method of eliminating medically unnecessary care.
IX. CONCLUSION

The corporate practice of medicine doctrine helped to improve the
reputation of organized medicine in the United States. The doctrine
prohibited entanglements between the physicians' exercise of their
professional judgments and the profit-making endeavors of lay
organizations. The purpose of the doctrine was to maintain the
physician's independence and help the physician operate as a fiduciary.
However, the doctrine also had anticompetitive consequences that
caused the federal government to implement policies which undermined
the doctrine. This has allowed cost containment to proceed in a manner
that allows payers to export the costs of doing business to providers of
health care services. The exportation of costs represents a hidden
subsidy to the private insurance industry. This subsidy is maintained at
the expense of the integrity of the patient-physician relationship. It
combines in one decision maker inherently antagonistic functions. This
involves physicians in the insurance function and thereby undermines
the fiduciary relationship between patients and their physicians. The
federal government has condoned and promoted risk-sharing
arrangements and has taken the position that it can protect patients
from the abuse of risk sharing by stipulating a magic threshold for risk
sharing. As long as the federal government declines to heed the message
of the corporate practice doctrine, the search for health care cost
containment will yield approaches that are dangerous or dishonest, or
both.

patient state law claim against HMO based on denial of benefits was preempted by ERISA). Seesupra notes
159-63 and accompanying text for background on ERISA.

